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The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal
Governance
WAYNE A. LOGAN*
Although it often escapes attention, municipal governments possess
significant authority to enact criminal laws consistent with their
expansive home rule and police powers. In this article, Professor
Logan explores the numerous ways in which this authority manifests,
and reflects upon, several of the main concerns presented by the
"shadow criminal law" thereby created. These concerns include the
negative practical consequences for individuals and entire
communities associated with the proliferation of criminal laws, in
which municipalities play a significant part; the specter that such
governments will indulge punitive or parochial tendencies; and the
pifalls associated with intra-state diversification of the criminal law.
Professor Logan argues that while localization has intuitive appeal,
consistent with the potent historic pull of local autonomy in
American governance more generally, this should not blind courts
and policy makers to its potential untoward effects. Rather than
continuing to focus on police discretion to enforce local laws,
heretofore the predominant concern of courts and commentators,
Logan urges that attention be directed at the critically important role
localities now play in the actual creation of the criminal law.
It is always time to say that this Nation is too large, too complex and composed
of too great a diversity of peoples for any one of us to have the wisdom to
establish the rules by which local Americans must govern their local
affairs .... [To assert otherwise] departs from the ancient faith based on the
premise that experience in making local laws by local people themselves is by
far the safest guide for a nation like ours to follow.'
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I thank Professors
Richard Briffault, Eric Janus, David Logan, Anthony Winer, and Ronald Wright for their
comments and support.
1 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,547-48 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its highly complex, heterogeneous character, modem America
remains drawn to an idealized model of local democratic governance, harkening
back to the halcyon days of Jefferson's citizen-farmers2 and Tocqueville's
illuminating visit to the young Republic's shores.3 Inspired by the core belief that
local decision-making promotes citizen' involvement and optimizes
responsiveness to local needs,4 local governance endures as a potent force in the
American body politic, 5 with its leitmotif "extreme decentralization." 6 While
nominally a union made up of fifty states and the District of Columbia, held
together by a federal constitutional infrastructure, in actuality America's
governing foundation entails tens of thousands of local polities, each with its own
aspirations, concerns, qualities, and interests.
2 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 12 THE WORKS
OF THOMAs JEFFERSON 3, at 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) (referring to small-scale, local
government as the "perfect exercise of self-government").
3 ALEXIS DE TOcQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62-63 (George Lawrence trans.,
1969):
[Tihe strength of free peoples resides in the local community. Local institutions are to
liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within the people's reach; they
teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it.
Without local institutions a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not got the
spirit of liberty.
4 ROBERT J. DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMuNrTY ASsOcIATIONS
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 132 (1992) ("There is a strong and prevailing belief embedded in
the American political culture that direct, participatory democracy is the best governmental
form because its decisionmaking process is based clearly and directly on the consent of the
governed."); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 113 (1990) [hereinafter Localism 1] (stating that "[l]ocal autonomy
is to a considerable extent the result of and reinforced by a systemic belief in the social and
political value of local decision making"). For other expressions of this sentiment, see, for
example, Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1123-28 (1996); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 317, 391-95 (1997); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253,
271 (1993).5 See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RuLE: A CuLTuRAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1995).
6 Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985,2002 (2000). Of course, at the
nation's origin and to this day, there has existed a countervailing distrust of local governance for
many of the same reasons advanced in its support. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 70 (James
Madison) (E. Boume ed., 1901).
7 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City,
145 U. PA. L. REv. 607, 625 (1997) ("The fracturing of local government is a basic concept in
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Not surprisingly, this diverse governing arrangement has led to conflict over
the course of the nation's history. For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown
an abiding ambivalence toward what Professor Richard Briffault has aptly called
"our localism,"8 at times recoiling from expressions of local autonomy and at
others embracing them.9 For the better part of the twentieth century, the Court
adopted a dismissive stance, conceiving of localities as little more than impotent
political subdivisions of their creators-the states.10 Over the past twenty years,
however, the Court, in keeping with its federalist-tendencies, has shown
increasing deference to exercises of not just state" but also local 2 governmental
American government ... its creation was not happenstance, but rather a deliberate attempt to
empower the individual.").8 Briffault, Localism I, supra note 4, at 113; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-
Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 346 (1990) [hereinafter Localism I].
Briffault notes that his allusion to "Our Federalism" is intentional:
"Our Localism," like "Our Federalism," emphasizes that local autonomy is not simply a
question of the structure of intergovernmental relations but also includes the ideology that
structure has generated-an ideology which continues to provide support for the
devolution of power to local governments.
Localism I, supra note 4, at 2 n.1.
9 Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History ofJurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 927
(1999):
[L]ocal difference is easily recast as factionalism and the courts toggle back and forth
between the two perspectives. Sometimes local decisions are lauded because they
supposedly reflect an organic lifestyle deserving of respect. At other times local decisions
are denigrated as the result of the disproportionate and concentrated influence of a faction.
'
0 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (noting the
"extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various types of political subdivisions
and conferring authority upon them"); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933)
("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of govemment, has no
privileges or immunities under the federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the
will of its creator."); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) ("The regulation
of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the State."); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the
State... ").
"See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
' See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986);
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457 (1982). The Court's decision in Romer
wan-ants particular mention because it invalidated a state's effort to abrogate a local law, in that
case Colorado's Amendment 2, which precluded local governments from enacting laws
protective of gays and lesbians, as the plaintiff-municipalities had done. Unfortunately, the
Court's pronounced emphasis on localism has been largely obscured by the broader civil
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power. Academics of late have also championed local governance, advancing
compelling arguments sounding in communitarianism,' 3 public and rational
choice theory,'4 civic republicanism,' and even local constitutional theory. 6
Adding still to the gravitational pull of localism is the notion that Americans lack
a sense of "belonging," 17 for which the greater intimacy of local governance
might serve as a tonic.' In short, notions of "community" and "place,"'19 while
historically enjoying enormous symbolic and emotive appeal, 20 are increasingly
liberties issues raised, as reflected in scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Jay Michaelson, On
Listening to the Kulturkampf or, How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though
Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DUKE L.J. 1559 (2000). But see Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of
Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1410-11 (1997) (noting the
underlying localist importance of Romer); Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the
Transformation of Local Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257, 257 (1999) (characterizing
Romer's "implications for local govemment law [as] unmistakable and dramatic").
,
3See, e.g., AMrrAi ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996); AMrTAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILTIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); PHILLIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL
COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1995); NEW
COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES (Amitai
Etzioni ed., 1995).
'4 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice
Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 959 (1991).
'See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
16 See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Mark D. Rosen,
Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the
Aid ofCommunity, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129 (1999).
17 See, eg.,.ROBERTN. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991); ROBERTN. BELLAH Er
AL, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985);
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000); ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998).
18 See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 94-102 (1999) (arguing same).
19 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY (1990); see also
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047
(1996); Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE Li. I
(1989); Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal. Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J.
Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1991).
20 See ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF CRIME: APPEALS TO COMMUNITY
AND PARTNERSHIPS 273 (1997) (noting that invocations of "community" enjoy "profound
emotional legitimacy"); Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures
or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215,
216 (noting the "appealing but highly manipulable rhetoric of 'community,' a rhetoric that is
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fostering tangible changes in methods of governance and, as importantly, how
social problems are conceived and the means by which such problems should be
addressed.21
This article focuses on a critically important aspect of this orientation: the role
of local governments, municipalities in particular, 2 in legislating against crime. 3
Although municipalities traditionally have enjoyed wide leeway in matters
pertaining to zoning,24 taxes, education,26 and the regulation of obscenity,27 it
increasingly prevalent in contemporary discourse. It is easy to appreciate the attractions of a
sense of place, shared values, and neighborhood empowerment....).21To a significant degree, this shift is the culmination of a path blazed in 1961 by
urbanologist Jane Jacobs, who stressed the value and importance of engaged community
(especially urban) life. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CrTIEs
(1961). Modem traces of the orientation are found not just in the current emphasis on
"community," but also in calls for a myriad of ever more super-localized institutions such as
residential community and neighborhood associations, business improvement districts, block
improvement districts, and the like. See GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE LrrrLE PLATOONS: SUB-
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MODERN HISTOR-, (1995) (discussing same); Richard Briffault, The
Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503 (1997); Robert C.
Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998).
22 This category is intended to include local, general purpose governments encompassing
cities, as well as large towns and villages. See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional
Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law,
1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 83 n.1 (1986) (conceiving of category in similar terms). The
designations "locality," "municipality," "local government," and "city," used here throughout,
are intended to refer to this same category. Counties, larger and quite distinct governmental
units, are not the focus. Nor are so-called "private" or "gated" communities, whose crime
control efforts present equally interesting yet quite distinct constitutional and policy issues. See
generally EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAiL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA (1997); Steven
Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional
Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifiy Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 461 (1998).
23 The predominant focus here on municipalities is in keeping with the practical
recognition that such governments possess considerably greater police power authority,
compared to county governments, necessitated by the more substantial and complex social
control needs of municipal areas. See EUGENE MCQUILLiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 24.34, at 101-03 (3d ed. rev. 1997 & Supp. 2000); see also infra notes 83-84
and accompanying text (discussing same).
24See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974). See generally Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the
Benefits and Burdens ofSuburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659 (1997).
25See, e.g., McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735 (Alaska 2001); Trebilcox v.
City of Sacramento, 266 P. 1015 (Cal. 1928); Brown v. City of Atlanta, 143 S.E.2d 388 (Ga.
19651.See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); cf. San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (evincing strong deference to local control of
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often escapes attention that they also enjoy considerable authority to enact
criminal laws28 pursuant to their expansive home rule and police powers.29 This
authority is especially pronounced today in the prevalent municipal effort to
legislate against public disorder and "quality of life" offenses, given effect by
such strategies as "zero tolerance" and "community" policing, which have
become mainstays of contemporary law enforcement
30
The local power to criminalize is neither new nor novel; since colonial times
localities have wielded considerable power to legislate against perceived forms of
social disorder in tandem with, and very often independent of, state government.
31
public schools in rejecting equal protection claim premised on disparate finding of school
districts on basis of state law). See generally Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial
Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State
JudicialReview ofEducation Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231 (1998).
27 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See generally Frank I. Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument. The Case of Pornography
Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989); Kevin J. Worthen, The Role of Local Governments
in Striking the Proper Balance Between Individualism and Communitarianism: Lessons for and
from Americans, 1993 BYU L. REV. 475 (1993).
2' Although for decades sanctionable offenses prescribed by municipal governments defied
categorization as "crimes," instead being euphemistically called "public torts," "public
welfare," "police," or "regulatory" offenses, today the criminal character of such laws is widely
accepted. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A TREATISE § 1.7(d) (2d ed.
2000).
29 See, e.g., Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296 (noting that "efforts to protect public health and
safety are clearly within the city's police powers").
Although an inherent power of municipal government, the legal concept of "police power"
historically has evaded precise definition. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)
(deeming "fruitless" any effort to "define its reach or trace its outer limits"); ERNST FREUND,
THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS iii (1904) (stating that "[t]he
term police power.., has remained without authoritative or generally accepted definition").
Providing as accurate a definition as perhaps any to date, one nineteenth-century commentator
broadly defined police power as the authority to "prescribe regulations to preserve and promote
the public safety, health and morals, and to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare
of society." Lewis Hockheimer, Police Power, 44 CENTRAL L.J. 158, 158 (1897). See generally
McQuillin, supra note 23, §§ 24.01-.02, 24.08-.09 (surveying the origins of municipal police
power authority and its continued breadth and dynamism).30 See generally Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422-
40 (2000) (surveying the variety of recent policing strategies that predominantly target such
offenses). As Professor Herman Goldstein has noted, "the new forms of policing expand the
police function from crime fighting, without an abdication of that role, to include maintaining
order, dealing with quality-of-life offenses, and fixing 'broken windows."' Herman Goldstein,
The New Policing: Confronting Complexity, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: PRESENT
REALITIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 97 (Paul F. Cromwell & Roger G. Dunham eds., 1997).
31 See infra notes 85-169 and accompanying text; see also James B. Jacobs, Legal and
Political Impediments to Lethal Violence Policy, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1998)
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Indeed, in recent decades the Supreme Court has had repeated occasion to address
municipal laws directed against loitering and vagrancy, most often invalidating
the laws on notice and/or overbreadth grounds.32 The Court's jurisprudence in this
area, and the ongoing efforts of municipalities to enact and enforce such laws,
have obsessed academic commentators over the years to the point of distraction.3
The focus of discussion, however, has been (and primarily remains) on the
age-old concems raised by the expansive application of the laws, especially
whether the quantum of discretion the laws afford police is constitutionally
acceptable. 34 Importantly, neither the Court nor the legion of commentators has
expressed concern over the significant basic power of localities to enact criminal
(observing that "[o]ur federal system allows (indeed provides for) a great deal of overlapping
authority and responsibility among federal, state, and local governments, and among the various
branches of government at each level").
In this sense, the teaming up of localities with coordinate state and federal governments is
consistent with the view, advanced most prominently by Michel Foucault, of an expansive
"disciplinary society." MICHEL FOUCAuLLT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
216 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND
VIOLENCE 120 (1987) (referring to government, in its various forms, as a "power container").32 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
33 See, e.g., David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the
New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy
and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police
Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51 RUrGERS L. REV. 1289 (1999); John Calvin
Jeffies, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189
(1985); Rollin M. Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958).
3 The relentless obsession with discretion, it warrants mention, is both misdirected and
futile. It is misdirected because the focus on police discretion has displaced critical scrutiny of
the substantive criminal law, thereby effectively freeing up legislative bodies to enact an
expansive array of criminal laws with virtual impunity. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 65-74
(1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's predominant focus on criminal justice procedures,
especially relating to search and seizure, has encouraged an expansiveness in the substantive
criminal law). It is futile because police officers are not now and have never been mere
ministerial agents of the state; they of necessity possess, and wield, enormous discretion to
enforce laws. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.32 (noting "common sense" proposition that "all
police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city
ordinances'); id at 65 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) ("[S]ome degree of police
discretion is necessary to allow the police 'to perform their peacekeeping responsibilities
satisfactorily."'); see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 593 (1997)
(observing that "[1limiting the discretion police exercise.., by demanding specificity in the
laws that they enforce is... hopeless").
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laws35 and the weak judicial controls over the "exorbitant codes" that can result.36
Meanwhile, local politicians have continued to busy themselves with the
substantive criminal law, making their influence felt in critically important ways.
Their efforts have resulted in the creation of a shadow criminal law that has
significantly expanded the range of behaviors that can be targeted by law
enforcement, created unique procedural regimes, and diversified the range of
sanctions attaching to criminal behavior, including the use of forfeiture. 7
In short, as much as they have recently asserted themselves in suing gun
makers,3 enacting "moratoriums" on the use of their states' death penalty laws,
39
and even seeking to influence international relations,40 municipalities are making
their presence felt in the realm of criminal law making. And they are doing so
with the benefit of not just the innate appeal of localism, discussed above, but also
35 Despite the Court's admonition in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) that
"there are constitutional limitations on the conduct that a State may criminalize," in reality the
Court has exerted scant constitutional control over substantive criminal law decisions of state
(and local) governments, except in cases involving vagueness and overbreadth. The most
notable exceptions to this disregard came some forty years ago in Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225 (1957), which invalidated a local law making it a crime for felons to fail to register
with local authorities, and in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which invalidated a
state law that made it a crime to be "addicted to narcotics."
Today, however, both Lambert and Robinson are largely ignored, forlorn representatives
of a substantive jurisprudence that might have been, to the enduring disappointment of criminal
law scholars. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 401, 411 (1958); Sanford H. Kadish, Essay, Fifly Years of Criminal Law: An
Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 964-66 (1999); Herbert L. Packer, The Aims of the
Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 490,497-98 (1971); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT.
REV. 107, 127; William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEG. IssuEs 1, 5-6 (1996).
' See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996):
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law
becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the
ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify such
exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we would decide, as
petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to
merit enforcement.
37 See infra notes 85-169 and accompanying text.38 See generally Brent W. Landau, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 623 (2000) (discussing lawsuits filed by thirty cities and legislative efforts by several
states to prohibit such suits).
39 See M. Scot Skinner, Council Likely to Urge Execution Moratorium, ARIz. DAILY STAR,
Nov. 20, 2000, at Al (noting more than thirty cities that have passed such resolutions).
40 See generally Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State
and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States'Affairs, or a Sony
State ofAffairs, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (1999).
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with a chorus of advocates who have sought to cleanse newly adopted criminal
laws of the criticisms and concerns besetting past laws.
Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, for instance, have vigorously
supported the emergence of a "new generation" of anti-vagrancy and loitering
laws, contending that prior discrimination-based concerns are no longer
wan-anted because the laws are the product of newly empowered minority
political interests and are being enforced by more racially representative and
sensitive police forces.' Similarly, Professor Robert Ellickson, in an influential
recent article, advocated the "defederalization" of "municipal street law"42 in
deference to the unique social control needs of municipalities.43 According to
Professor Ellickson, "[j]udges should not prevent the residents of America's cities
from preserving the vitality of their downtowns." 4 Building upon this same
sentiment, Justice Thomas, dissenting from the Court's recent invalidation of
Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance in City of Chicago v. Morales, mordantly
stated: "Today, the Court focuses extensively on the 'rights' of gang members
and their companions. It can safely do so-the people who will have to live with
the consequences of today's opinion do not live in our neighborhoods."45
Nor is this orientation likely to abate any time soon, given the ongoing
efforts of criminal justice planners to localize law enforcement. 46 Manifestations
41 Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1183-84 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Law and (Norms oj) Order in
the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 830-31 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L.
Meares, When Rights are Wrong, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 4, 8.42 Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE LJ. 1165, 1241 (1996) [hereinafter Chronic
Misconduct].431 Id. at 1245.
44Id. at 1248. For similar expressions of this view, see, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING &
CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME
IN OUR COMMUNITIES 41-60 (1996); Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, The Court, and Some
Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 141; Livingston, supra note 34, at 561-62.
4'527 U.S. 41, 114 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 74 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[t]he minor limitation upon the free state of nature that this
prophylactic arrangement imposed upon all Chicagoans seemed to them (and it seems to me) a
smallj0rice to pay for liberation of their streets").
Although criminological theory has, for decades, emphasized "place," of late this
orientation has assumed newfound popularity, both here and abroad. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE AssISTANCE, U.S. DEPT. OF JusTIcE, THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
COMMUNITY SAFETY (April 2001); ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF CRIME:
APPEALS TO COMMUNITY AND PARTNERSHIPS (1997); WILLL M DELEON-GRANADOS, TRAVELS
THROUGH CRIME AND PLACE: COMMUNITY BUILDING AS CRIME CONTROL (1999);
GOVERNABLE PLACES: READINGS ON GOVERNMENTALITY AND CRIME CONTROL (Russell
Smandych ed. 1999); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J.
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of this emphasis are seen in such widely adopted strategies as "community"-
oriented courts, prosecution, and policing;47 neighborhood "crime mapping;" 48
urban design changes to achieve "defensible space"; 49 and anti-gang civil
injunctions, backed by criminal sanctions, implemented within particular
neighborhoods regarding specific individuals.5 ° As noted earlier, aggressive "zero
tolerance" policing strategies-that target the litany of low-level public disorder
offenses that are the primary but not exclusive focus of municipal criminal
laws-remain a widely touted method of urban social control.," Localization is
also apparent in the growing body of geographic-specific criminal laws aimed at
particular social ills. While for some time the state and federal governments have
SOCIOLOGY 603 (1999). Professors Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay were among the first, and
most influential, scholars to make the connection between geography and rates of criminal
victimization. See generally CLIFFORD R. SHAw & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENCY IN RELATION TO
DIFFERENTIAL CHARACrERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITEs IN AMERICAN CITES (2d ed. 1969).
47 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, COMMUNITY
COURTS: AN EVOLVING MODEL (2000); CRIME AND PLACE: PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1997
CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION (1998); COMMUNrIY
JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD (David R. Karp ed., 1998); WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M.
HARTNETT, COMMUNrrY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE (1997); Elaine Nugent & Gerard A.
Rainville, The State of Community Prosecution: Results of a National Survey, THE
PROSECUTOR, Mar-Apr. 2001, at 26.48 See generally KErrH HARRIES, MAPPING CRIME: PRINCIPLE AND PRACrllE (1999);
THOMAS RICH, CRIME MAPPING AND ANALYSIS BY COMMUNIY ORGANiZATIONS IN
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT (2001); ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS: FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE
(Victor Goldsmith et al. eds., 2000).
49 See generally OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
URBAN DESIGN (1972); Marlene A. Pontrelli, Crime Solutions Through Planning and Zoning,
A.B.A. SECTION ON STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T LAW, 24 STATE & LOCAL NEWS 16 (Winter
2001); Ralph B. Taylor et al., Block Crime and Fear: Defensible Space, Local Social Ties, and
Territorial Functioning, 21 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 303 (1984).
5 See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (denying
constitutional challenge to injunction declaring specified gang members as public nuisances and
empowering local police to arrest for instances of contempt). For commentary on this highly
popular method, see, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A
Restorative Justice Critique ofAnti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 717 (2000); Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at Its Word: A Defense of the Use
of Anti-Gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47 (1999); Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars:
Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 477 (1994). Prostitution has also been targeted by the injunction strategy. See, e.g., City of
New York v. Andrews, 719 N.Y.S.2d 442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (rejecting City's effort to enjoin
prostitutes and suspected pimps from frequenting neighborhoods).
5' See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Symposium, Zero Tolerance Policing
Initiatives-Legal and Policy Perspectives, 35 CRIM. L. BULL. 333 (1999).
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enhanced criminal penalties relative to criminal acts in particular areas, such as
using, selling, or possessing weapons or drugs near churches, parks, and
schools,52 cities are now weighing in and adding even more specificity tailored to
their distinct local needs.53 Even Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is showing the
earmarks of localization, with courts regularly taking into account specific
neighborhood characteristics when evaluating probable cause and reasonable
suspicion determinations by police.54
That crime control should evolve in this self-consciously localized manner
should come as no surprise, given that the human consequences55 and articulated
explanations56 of crime are largely local in nature, as are police enforcement
52 See, ag., United States v. Hodge, 89 F. Supp. 2d 668 (D. V.I. 2000) (addressing federal
statute enhancing sentences for possessing drugs near school); People v. Falbe, 727 N.E.2d 200
(Ill. 2000) (addressing Illinois statutory sentence enhancement for drug sales near places of
worship); Reed v. State, 720 N.E.2d 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (addressing Indiana statute
prohibiting possession of narcotics near public parks); State v. Crawford, 727 So. 2d 589 (La.
Ct. App. 1998) (addressing Louisiana's statutory sentence enhancement for drug sales near
schools).
53See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(addressing Cincinnati law that designated "drug free" zones in particular areas of the City,
permitting arrests for criminal trespass after issuance of prior exclusion order from area);
Powers v. State, 619 A.2d 538 (Md. 1993) (addressing Baltimore law that proscribed loitering
in "drug free" zones); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (addressing Portland
law similar to that of Cincinnati noted supra).
Such strategies bear the unmistakable influence of Professor Robert Ellickson, who has
urged that "a city's codes of conduct should be allowed to vary spatially from street to street,
from park to park, from sidewalk to sidewalk. Just as some system of 'zoning' may be sensible
for private lands, so it may be for public lands." Ellickson, Chronic Misconduct, supra note 42,
at 1171-72. According to Professor Ellickson, "[j]udges should generally refrain from
construing federal constitutional clauses to deny cities the capacity to spatially differentiate their
street policies." Id. at 1219; see also Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973).
"' See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (attaching importance in Terry "stop
and frisk" analysis to fact that the defendant was in a "high-crime area"); United States v.
Rucker, 138 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (deeming it relevant in probable cause determination that
search occurred in a "high drug trafficking area!); United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510 (5th
Cir. 1995) (deeming it relevant in probable cause determination that search occurred in "a high
crime area"). See generally Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street:
Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 99, 99 (1999) (noting that perceptions of neighborhood character "can come to
dominate the reasonable suspicion inquiry").55 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention 8-3-8-15, in LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN Er AL., PREVENI'NG CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING: A
REPORT TO THE UNrTED STATES CONGRESS (1997) (discussing epidemiological studies
highlighting distinctly localized nature of criminal victimization and existence of crime "hot
spots).
See ROBERT J. BURSuK, JR. & HARoLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME:
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efforts.57 It thus makes intuitive sense that the substantive definition of crimes
should emanate from locals, who at once can give expression to specific social
and geographic conditions, and, as the criminal law does more generally, single
out particular behaviors for sanctioni8 Furthermore, greater localization holds
promise that municipal governments can serve as "laboratories" in a manner
analogous to our venerated state-federal relationship, allowing local
experimentation in methods of social control.s9
At the same time, however, the aggressive involvement of municipalities in
criminal lawmaking raises an array of potential concerns distinct from the
vagueness and overbreadth challenges that have historically been the focus of so
much debate? ° This article highlights the increasing role of local governments,
THE DIMENSIONS OFEFFECrwE COMMUNITY CONTROL (1993) (explaining delinquency rates on
the basis of physical, demographic, and institutional aspects of neighborhoods); Robert J.
Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy,
SCIENCE, Aug. 17, 1999, at 918-24 (noting strong statistical differences in crime rates among
neighborhoods, depending on variations in "social capital," i.e., the willingness of residents to
become engaged in community affairs).
57 See HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 131-32 (1977) (noting that
decentralization of law enforcement is a cardinal feature of U.S. policing); John S. Baker, Jr.,
State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 693 (1999)
(noting that "variations in local needs mean that law enforcement cannot be organized for
efficiency along a uniform model, even within a single state").58 See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1869 (2000) ("Perhaps
more than any other society, ours relies on the criminal law for norm-nurturing.... Our
criminal law is, for us, the place we express our shared beliefs of what is truly condemnable.");
see also Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to the New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2002 (2000) ("Local
governments serve as teachers of civic virtue and as essential components of the republican
system, helping citizens to fulfill their proper role through daily participation in governmental
affairs.").
59The reference, of course, dates from Justice Brandeis who in 1932 urged that we "let our
minds be bold" in contemplating local experimentation with laws:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;, and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of this view with particular regard to the criminal justice system see Kevin R.
Wright, The Desirability of Goal Conflict Within the Criminal Justice System, 9 CRIM. JUST.
209, 213-14 (1981) (endorsing diversity because it permits inevitable conflicts in community
values to be fleshed out and resolved).
6o Ironically, successful vagueness and overbreadth challenges against purposefully broad
vagrancy and loitering laws, in particular, might well serve to foster the proliferation of local
criminal laws, encouraging localities to enact additional laws that are more specific in substance
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not just in enforcing criminal laws, but also in defining them, and examines many
of the associated concerns.
The article begins with an examination of the origins of municipal legislative
authority and explores how this expansive power currently manifests in the realm
of criminal law. The article then explores several of the most significant potential
consequences of municipal criminal lawmaking authority, which include: (1) the
negative effects on the daily lives of community residents, and the well-being of
communities themselves, as a result of the proliferation of local criminal laws; (2)
the threat of oppressive or unduly restrictive laws ("exorbitant codes"), enacted by
local legislators; and (3) the balkanization of the criminal law within the states
themselves as a consequence of the varied substantive criminal provisions,
sanctions, and procedures evidenced in municipalities. The article concludes with
an exploration of whether, and to what extent these potential pitfalls should
outweigh the avowed benefits of local autonomy, which for better or worse is
here to stay.
II. THE ORIGINS OF MUNICIPAL LEGISLATIVE POWER, ITS EXTENT, AND ITS
LIMITS
Despite the fact that municipal governments are "subdivisions" of the state6'
and are accorded no express recognition by the U.S. Constitution,62 they
indisputably possess-and wield-considerable legislative power. The story of
how they came to exercise such power is an evolutionary one, in many ways
reflecting Americans' preference for local autonomy, as opposed to uniformity,
and the respective risks and benefits of each.
From the nation's origin, and well into the nineteenth century, cities were
and diversified in scope. This response has perhaps been most evident in urban police efforts to
combat homelessness. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity, 66 TULANE L. REv. 631, 650
(1992) (noting that "[w]ith the invalidation of vagrancy and loitering laws, officials have turned
to arrest campaigns against sleeping in public to punish and control the displaced poor").
61 City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that "municipalities
have no inherent right of self government which is beyond the legislative control of the
state.... [T]he state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit");
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (stating that "[m]unicipal corporations
are political subdivisions of the State").
62 Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1382
(1997) ("The Constitution does not recognize local governments as independent political
entities: As far as the Constitution is concerned, local governments ... are merely state
subdivisions). For discussions of the legal status of local government in the context of federal
constitutional law more generally, see M. David Gelfand, The Constitutional Position of
American Local Government: Retrospect for the Burger Court and Prospect for the Rehnquist
Court, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635 (1987); Carol F. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status
ofMunicipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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largely autonomous units of government. According to Professor William Novak,
American municipalities were "self-regulating communities," which were
"infinitely more important to regular governance" than the state and federal
governments. 63 According to Novak: "No community was deemed free without the
power and right of members to govern themselves, that is, to determine the rules under
which the locality as a whole would be organized and regulated. Such open-ended local
regulatory power was simply a necessary attribute of any truly popular sovereignty. ' 6
In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, however, a decidedly more hierarchical
view of state-local relations came to prevail, prompted in part by concerns that
local officials were engaged in improper bond schemes with increasingly
powerful railroad interests.6' Under "Dillon's Rule," the eponymous doctrine
made popular by Iowa Supreme Court Justice John Dillon,66 municipal
governments were deemed to possess only such powers (1) "granted in express
words"; (2) "those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted"; or (3) "those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the [local government]-not simply convenient, but
indispensable." 67 Consistent with this abstemious view, any doubts over whether
authority devolved to locals in a particular instance were to be resolved in the
negative in favor of the all-powerful state.68
6' WILLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 10 (1996).
'AId.; see also id. at 237 ("In contrast to the modem ideal of the state as centralized
bureaucracy, the well-regulated society emphasized local control and autonomy."). According
to urban historian Stanley Schultz, "municipal law" had a characteristically expansive meaning
in America's early years:
From the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century, "municipal law" in both England and
North America referred to the sovereign legal system of an individual state as
distinguished from intemational law. Thus, through the 1830s Americans commonly used
the term to refer not only to the law of a city but also to that of the individual state.
STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, CONSTRUCTING URBAN CULTURE: AMERICAN CITIES AND CrrY
PLANNING 60 (1989).
65 See generally Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power under Home Rule: A
Rolefor the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 647-49 (1964).
6 For more in-depth discussions of Dillon's influence, which competed against that of his
contemporary, Justice Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, who advocated greater
local autonomy, see David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 509-22 (1999); Joan C. Williams, The
Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in
American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 88-90.
67 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237,
at 448-49 (5th ed. 1911).
68 See id. at 449-50 (stating that "[a]ny fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the
existence of power is resolved by the courts against the [municipal] corporation, and the power
is denied").
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This notion of plenary state power receded in the late 1800s, however, when
localism reemerged as a result of decisions by numerous states to amend their
constitutions to empower local governments by means of "home rule"
provisions. 69 The home rule movement was expressly intended to reverse the
restrictive, anti-local orientation of Dillon's Rule, and the movement blossomed
over the ensuing decades, 70 serving as both an explicit source of local lawmaking
power and a bulwark against state legislative interference. 7 Today, some forty-
three states are considered home nile jurisdictions72 as a result of constitutional or
legislative intervention, making each municipality a "miniature State within its
locality."73
In the case of constitutional home rule jurisdictions, local power can be self-
executing, emanating directly from the constitutional grant itself. The California
Constitution, for instance, provides that a "city may make and enforce within its
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in
conflict with general laws."74 Other constitutional home rule jurisdictions
expressly empower localities to frame "charters," which themselves typically
enumerate similarly broad grants of power.75 Legislative home rule jurisdictions,
69 See generally SANDRA M. STEVENSON, 1 ANTiEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
§ 21.01, at 21-3 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter ANTIEAU] (noting "[m]odem American home rule
dates from the adoption of the first constitutional home rule amendment by Missouri in 1875").
70 See Localism I, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that "the postwar era has witnessed a steady
broadening of the discretionary authority of local governments").71 Id. at 16 n.53 (stating "[t]he core of home rule is the creation and preservation of
governmental structures for independent local decision making and political participation").
7 See ANTEAU, supra note 69, § 21.0 1, at 21-3-21-6.
7 Dist. of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953); see also
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 298 n.9 (6th Cir.
1997) (stating "a municipality is a unitary local political subdivision or unit comprised,
fidamentally, of the territory and residents within its geographical boundaries").
74 CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7; see also ILL. CONsT. art. 7, § 6(a) ("[A] home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including,
but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals
and welfare... "); OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 ("Municipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.");
WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (extending to cities the power to "make and enforce within its
limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws').5 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 ("Any city containing, now or hereafter, a
population of more than three thousand five hundred may frame a charter for its own
govknment consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and the laws of the State .... ');
PA. CONST. art. 9, § 2 ("A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power
or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the
General Assembly at any time."). See generally ANTIEAU, supra note 69, § 21.03, at 21-15-21-
18 (providing other examples).
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on the other hand, derive their power from state legislation enacted pursuant to
constitutional mandate.76
Under either scenario, home rule affords municipalities significant power to
enact laws concerning public safety and welfare,77 backed by liberal construction
of such grants.78 While the substance of local laws must of course comport with
state and federal constitutional provisions, home rule municipalities are limited in
their power to enact public safety-related laws only when the subject matter of the
law is (1) expressly or implicitly "preempted" by a state legislative provision, or
(2) the substance of the law itself "conflicts" with existing state law.79 The
Michigan Court of Appeals characterized the relationship between the two
related, yet distinct, doctrines as follows:
The preemption doctrine provides that a municipal ordinance may not invade a
field completely occupied by state statute. Where the state has preempted the
field, the ordinance is void, irrespective of whether the statute and ordinance
conflict. The conflict doctrine only invalidates ordinances actually in conflict
with the state law where the entire area has not been preempted.80
On its face, preemption doctrine would appear to categorically preclude
municipalities from legislating against crime. This is because, historically, the
task of defining and designating punishments for crimes has fallen to state
76 See, e.g., N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAw § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 2000) ("[E]very local
government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws... relating to its property, affairs
or govemment."); TEx. LoC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.004 (Vernon 2000) (empowering home
rule cities to "enforce ordinances necessary to protect health, life, and property and to preserve
the good govemment, order, and security of the municipality and its inhabitants"). See generally
ANrTIEU, supra note 69, § 21.04, at 21-18-21-23 (providing other examples).
77 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 24.32, at 96-97 ("[M]unicipal corporations have
police powers to safeguard the health, comfort and general welfare of their inhabitants by such
reasonable regulations as are necessary for the purpose. They always have had such power,
although they have it only by virtue of its delegation to them by the state.").
7 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6(m) ("[P]owers and functions of home rule units shall be
construed liberally."); MICH. CONsT. art. 7, § 34 ('The provisions of this constitution and law
concerning counties, townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor.");
Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168, 1171 (La. 1984) ("[A] home rule charter government
possesses, in affairs of local concern, powers which within its jurisdiction are as broad as that of
the state, except when limited by the constitution, laws permitted by the constitution, or its own
home rule charter."); City of Detroit v. Recorder's Court Traffic & Ordinance Judge, 304
N.W.2d 829, 840-41 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) ("[T]he home rule act grants general rights and
powers subject only to certain enumerated restrictions. Its purpose was to give cities a large
measure of home rule. The statute should be construed liberally in the home rule spirit.").
79 See generally George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the
Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REv. 417, 423-33 (1995)
(providing overview of'preemption and conflict doctrines).
80City ofDetroit, 304 N.W.2d at 836.
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legislatures, especially with respect to the "general criminal laws."81 However,
any inference of state hegemony with respect to criminal law making would be
entirely incorrect. Legislative silence on public safety matters is common, 2
stemming as much from states' practical inability to identify the expansive range
and unique forms of municipal disorder,83 as the felt need to permit cities latitude
in tailoring criminal law responses to their distinct needs.84
As a result of such silence and the judicial proclivity to apply preemption
narrowly,85 municipalities enjoy enormous power to legislate against social
S" See, eg., City of Knoxville v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tenn. 1984) (observing
that home rule entities "are given certain protection from interference by the General Assembly
under the Home Rule Amendment with respect to local matters, but not with respect to
jurisdiction over violation of the state's general criminal laws").
'2 See ANTIEAU, supra note 69, § 21.05[2], at 21-32 ("The reality is that state legislatures
seldom legislate on all state or general concerns, and a social and political vacuum would exist
if a home rule entity desired to impose controls on these matters within its own borders and was
not permitted to do so.'); see also, eg., People v. Ortiz, 479 N.Y.S.2d 613, 622 (N.Y. Cty.
Crim. Ct. 1984) (observing that "silence by the state on a particular issue should not be
interpreted as an expression of intent to preempt. To interpret a statute in this manner would
vitiate home rule"); State v. Lopez-Vega, 826 P.2d 48, 50 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (noting with
respect to Oregon home rule provision that "[a]lthough proposals were made that would have
forbidden local governments from enacting ordinances that provided for a sentence of
imprisonment for acts not designated as crimes by the state, they were rejected").
a3 See, eg., Horton v. City of Oaldand, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(citation omitted) ("When state legislation does not address the demands of particular urban
areas, 'it becomes proper and even necessary for municipalities to add to state regulations
provisions adapted to their special requirements."'); City of North Charleston v. Harper, 410
S.E.2d 569, 571 (S.C. 1991) (recognizing that "more stringent regulation often is needed in
cities than in the state as a whole").
4 See, e.g., Town of Van Buren v. Wells, 14 S.W. 38, 39 (Ark. 1890) ('Municipal
corporations.., are founded in part upon the idea that the needs of the localities for which they
are organized, by reason of the density of population or other circumstances, are more extensive
and urgent than those of the general public in the same particulars. Many acts are often far more
injurious, while the temptation to do them are [sic] much greater, in such localities than in the
state generally."); Horton, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (citation omitted) ("The general fact that
state legislation concentrates on specific areas, and leaves related areas untouched' has been
held to demonstrate 'a legislative intent to permit local govemments to continue to apply their
police power according to the particular needs of their communities in areas not specifically
preempted.").
' See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 21.32, at 318 (stating same and providing examples).
As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted over thirty years ago:
We take judicial notice that our legislature has in this recent decade moved on several
fronts to assist, but not to replace, local government in meeting the extraordinary needs of
the metropolitan area, such as the elimination of conditions which diminish the quality of
urban life. We are averse, in these circumstances, to hold that the legislature contemplates
its own regulation to exclude municipal regulation, without most clear manifestation of
such intent. It is imperative... that the legislature should manifest its preemptive intent in
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disorder independent of state jurisdiction. As noted by a leading treatise, "the
range of conduct prohibited by ordinances is extremely broad and signifies the
importance of municipal control of offenses against the sovereignty of the state,
conceiving the municipality to be an arm and agency of that sovereignty. '8 6 A
sample of independent municipal criminal laws includes: pick-pocketing;
87
disturbing the peace;"8 shoplifting;89 urinating in public;90 disorderly conduct;9'
disorderly assembly;92 unlawful restraint;93 obstruction of public space;94
harassment over the telephone;95 resisting arrest;96 obscenity;97 nude dancing;9
lewdness, public indecency, and indecent exposure;99 prostitution, pimping, or the
operation of "bawdy" houses;'0° gambling;'0 ' graffiti and the materials associated
the clearest terms.
State v. Dailey, 169 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Minn. 1969); see also City of Seattle v. Shin, 748 P.2d
643, 646 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (asserting that "[t]he mere fact that a state criminal statute
exists in the area is not evidence of the need for a single state-wide standard").
86 MCQUILUN, supra note 23, § 23.13, at 531.
87 See, e.g., Kansas City v. Henderson, 468 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1971).
88 See, e.g., Plymouth Township v. Hancock, 600 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. 1999); City of Tiffin
v. McEwen, 720 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio 1998).
'9 See, e.g., Eflekhar-Zadeh v. Lusero, 592 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1979).
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); McConnell
v. State, No. 14-99-00887-CR, 2001 WL 8344, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 4,2001).
91 See, e.g., City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445 (La. 1995); City of Bismarck
v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1989); Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 7 P.3d 789 (Utah Ct. App.
2000).
See, e.g., State v. Bowers, 498 N.W.2d 202 (S.D. 1993).
93 See, e.g., City of Broadview Heights v. Baron, 745 N.E.2d 516 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
N See, e.g., Diaz v. City of Fitchburg, 176 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 1999).
95 See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Alires, 9 P.3d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); City of Bellevue v.
Loranp, 963 P.2d 198 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Smith, 597 N.W.2d 247 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); City of
Watertown v. Busshardt, 549 N.W.2d 286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
97See, e.g., State v. Odom, 554 So. 2d 1281 (La. Ct. App. 1989); City of Portland v.
Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646 (Me. 1985); City of Urbana v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio
1989). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106E (West 2000). But see People v. Llewellyn, 257
N.W.2d 902 (Mich. 1977) (invalidating local obscenity law because legislature implied
need for single, state-wide standard); City of Spokane v. Portch, 596 P.2d 1044 (Wash.
1979) (same).
See, eg., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Lim v. City of Long Beach,
217 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2000); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248 (5th Cir.
1995).
9See, e.g., South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.
1984); State v. Botsford, 630 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Tri-State Metro Naturists v.
Township of Lower, 529 A.2d 1047 (N.J. 1987).
1oo See, e.g., State v. Loughran, 693 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Johnson,
578 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1978); Allen v. City of Oklahoma City, 965 P.2d 387 (Okla. Crim. App.
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with its inscription;1°2 littering; 10 3 aggressive begging and panhandling;' °4
vandalism; 105 trespass;106 automobile "cruising"; 107 animal control;
08 nuisances;'09
excessive noise; 1 sale or possession of drug paraphernalia;"' simple drug
possession; 2 possession of weapons other than firearms; possession of basicfirearmsz1 and assault-style firearms;" 5 discharge of fireans;1 6 sleeping, lying,
1998); Flannery v. City of Norfolk, 218 S.E.2d 730 (Va. 1975).101 See, ag., Bugsy's, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 530 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 2000).
i02 See, e.g., Nat'l Paint & Coating Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995);
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 857 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Herring, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Or. 1999); People v.
Whitted, 718 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 2000).
104 See, e.g., Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d
699 (2d Cir. 1993); Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990);
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
10s See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 439 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
06 See, e.g., Batiste v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); City of
Monroe v. Goldston, 661 So. 2d 428 (La. 1995).
'7See, e.g., Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990); Brandmiller v. Arreola,
544 N.W.2d 894 (Wis. 1996).
108 See, eg., Singer v. City of Cincinnati, 566 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); City of
Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas, 794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990); Rabon v. City
of Seattle, 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998).
109 See, eg., City of Chicago v. Cecola, 389 N.E.2d 526 (111. 1979); Biggs v. Griffith, 231
S.W.2d 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).
1o See, e.g., City of Marietta v. Grams, 531 N.E.2d 1331 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Howard v.
City of Tulsa, 712 P.2d 797 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); City of Beaufort v. Baker, 432 S.E.2d
479 (SC 1993).
7' "See .a, Cardarella v. City of Overland Park, 620 P.2d 1122 (Kan. 1980).
112 See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 422 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); City of Niles v.
Howard, 466 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio 1984); Rossberg v. State, 74 A. 581 (Md. 1909).113 See, e.g., People v. Gerardo, 220 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Ortiz,
479 N.Y.S2d 613 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984); City of Cleveland v. Barnes, 477 N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984); State v. Rabon, 727 P.2d 995 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
" See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 2000); Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982); Hyde v. City of Birmingham, 392 So. 2d 1226
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980); City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999);
Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E2d 266 (11. 1984); Junction City v. Lee, 532
P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1975); City of Cape Girardeau v. Joyce, 884 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6120(a) (West 2000) ("No county, municipality or township
may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or transportation of
firearms... ."); Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152 (Pa. 1996) (invalidating laws enacted
by Philadelphia and Pittsburgh that banned assault-style weapons).
"5 See, e.g., Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994); Arnold
v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
"
6 See, eg., City of Seattle v. Ballsmider, 856 P.2d 1113 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
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or camping in public places;'"7 driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol; 8
carrying an open container of alcohol;1 9 underage drinking; 120 and public
drinking and intoxication.12 1 Of course, anti-vagrancy and loitering laws remain a
common (if controversial) manifestation of municipal power, as they have for
decades,' 22 and curfews for minors have recently become a staple of local police
power.'2 Criminal assault and battery are also the frequent subjects of municipal
law making, notwithstanding that the associated physical harms are of "state
concern."
124
Conflict doctrine likewise exercises relatively little control.12 A municipal
"17 See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000); Roulette v. City of
Seattle, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996); Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18 (Ist Cir.
1991); Vehicular Residents Assoc. v. Agnos, 272 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).118 See, eg., State v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); City of Lake
Charles v. Henning, 414 So. 2d 331 (La. 1982); Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
"9 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 183 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1999); People v. Pantusco, 484
N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
120 See, e.g., State v. Weltzin, 630 N.W.2d 406,408 (Minn. 2001).
121 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Goldstein v.
City of Atlanta, 234 S.E.2d 344 (Ga. 1977).
122 See, e.g., Yuen v. Municipal Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); State v.
Kemp, 429 So. 2d 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d
562 (Wis. 1989).
Of late, localities have sought to avoid vagueness and overbreadth challenges by enacting,
with some success, more narrowly drawn provisions that target "loitering with unlawful intent"
to commit specified offenses. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio.
1987) (prostitution); City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992) (drug sales). See
generally William Trosch, Comment, The Third Generation of Loitering Laws Goes to Court:
Do Laws that Criminalize "Loitering with the Intent to Sell Drugs" Pass Constitutional
Muster?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 513 (1993).
12 See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998); Qutb v.
Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993); State v. T.M., A.N. and D.N., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000); Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (11. Ct. App. 1990). See
generally William Ruefle & Kenneth M. Reynolds, Curfews and Delinquency in Major
American Cities, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 347, 353 (1995) (observing that juvenile curfews
became the "norm in major American cities" in the 1990s).
States have also been known to enact their own broad curfew laws, while yielding express
authority to locals to enact more aggressive curfew provisions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 877.20-.25 (West 2000); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 555/2 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); 65 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. 5/11-1-5 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
124 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Roman, 705 N.E.2d 81 (II1. 1998); City of Westland v.
Okopski, 527 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); City of Cleveland v. Murrad, 616 N.E.2d
1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); City of Spokane v. White, 10 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
25 See, e.g., McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 167 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2000) ("[The true test is whether the municipal ordinance is irreconcilably at odds with
state law ... that enforcement of the municipal provision defeats the operation of state law.");
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law impermissibly conflicts, and is therefore invalid, when "the ordinance permits
or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.'
26
Accordingly, conflict is plainly avoided when a municipality criminalizes, in
identical terms, behavior already the subject of state criminal law, creating a form
of concurrent criminal jurisdiction.127 Such concurrent jurisdiction is very
common, being at once emblematic of local assertiveness, and the desire of local
governments to retain prosecutorial authority and control over any fines that
might attach. However, while it on occasion triggers inter-jurisdictional tension
involving "race[s] to the court house" by competing state and local prosecutorial
offices, 121 in itself it does little to augment the reach of local power in practical
terms.
129
Municipalities most definitely do augment their power, and avoid
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1938) ("Unless legislative provisions are
contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not to be deemed inconsistent
because of mere lack of uniformity in detail."); City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1379
(Wash. 1992) ('The conflict must be direct and irreconcilable with the statute.... If the
ordinance and the statute can be harmonized, then the statute should not be construed as
restricting a municipality's power ...... '). See generally MCQUILUIN, supra note 23, § 23.07, at
514 (citing other examples).
126 Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E.2d 519, 520 (Ohio 1923); see also State v.
Rabon, 727 P.2d 995, 997 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ("The basic rule for determining whether an
ordinance conflicts with state law is whether the ordinance attempts to authorize what the
Legislature has forbidden or does it forbid [sic] what the Legislature has expressly licensed,
authorized, or required.").
127 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 23.10, at 524 ("The majority rule is that the same act
may be made an offense both against the state and also against a municipal corporation; in other
words, an act that violates both a state statute and an ordinance may be treated as a penal
offense both under the statute and under the ordinance.");.e.g., City of Spokane v. White, 10
P.3d 1095, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) ("Under constitutional police powers, cities may enact
ordinances prohibiting the same acts state law prohibits as long as the city ordinance does not
conflict with the general laws of the state."). Indeed, it is not uncommon for municipalities to
enact catch-all laws that make all state misdemeanors occurring within the municipality
municipal offenses. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 23.06, at 512.
128Bush v. Williams, 504 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
129 As discussed later, however, concurrent jurisdiction does redound to the benefit of
municipalities in several respects to the extent they are empowered to sanction differently than
concurrent state law. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text (discussing how local
power to impose lesser punishments in relation to concurrent laws can enhance prosecutorial
power and avoid expenditures associated with jury trials and appointed counsel).
Furthermore, it bears mention that, to the extent state and local laws are identical,
successive prosecutions are precluded on Fifth Amendment double jeopardy grounds, as state
and local governments are not considered "dual sovereigns," unlike the state and federal
govemments. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). However, as noted below, the
propensity of localities to distinguish, if only slightly, local laws from substantively similar state
laws largely undercuts this limit.
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invalidation of laws as a result of conflict, when they make "refinements" to
almost identical state criminal laws. 30 This is achieved, for example, when a
municipality, while targeting the same basic behavior as state law, requires a
distinct criminal mens rea,3 adds a particular element not contained in state
law, or imposes distinct evidentiary presumptions. 33 Similarly, a municipality
can distinguish similar state criminal law by means of altering the focus of a given
law in highly specified geographic terms.' 34 For instance, because municipalities
enjoy the unquestioned right to regulate their parks and recreation spaces, local
gun laws that are more restrictive than similar state laws also targeting such sub-
areas have been upheld. 13S As noted by the Washington Court of Appeals:
"[w]hile an absolute and unqualified local prohibition against possession of a
pistol by the holder of a state permit would conflict with state law, an ordinance
which is a limited prohibition reasonably related to particular places and
necessary to protect the public safety, health, morals and general welfare" of a
given locality is permissible.136 The specification of "exclusion zones" that ban
from certain areas of the city individuals previously convicted of drug'37 or
130 See C. DALLAS SANDS Er AL., LOCAL GOvERNMENT LAW § 14.38, at 14-109 (1997 &
Supp. 2000) (noting that "[r]efinements of detail which are reasonably related to differing local
conditions and which are consistent with the broad parameters of the state law are, in the better
view, sustained").
131 See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 479 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984) (upholding local law
that banned possession of knives with blade of four or more inches, in contrast to state law that
prohibited such weapons on the basis of heightened scienter); City of Portland v. Jackson, 850
P.2d 1093 (Or. 1993) (upholding local law that banned public nudity, without regard to
purpose, despite state law that banned nudity only if persons acted with purpose to sexually
arouse); City of Spokane v. White, 10 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding local
domestic violence assault law because law required lesser form of intent ("wilfbl") than similar
state law).
'
32 See SANDS Er AL., supra note 130, § 11.25, at 110 (citing examples and noting that
courts have "sustained local tinkering with state enactments on the purely verbalistic criteria
that the local ordinance provides for an element of the offense which is not present in the
statutory definition of conduct constituting a violation.").
'33 See, eg., People v. Chen Ye, 685 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999) (recognizing
local power to legislate relative to presumptions); City of Dickinson v. Gresz, 450 N.W.2d 216
(N.D. 1989) (same).
34 See, e.g., Batiste v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
local trespass law because it concerned different part of airport than that addressed by state
trespass law).
135 See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding local
law that prohibited use or possession of firearm within municipal parks).
136 Second Amendment Foundation v. City of Renton, 668 P.2d 596, 599 (Wash. Ct. App.
1983).
137 See, e.g., State v. Burnett, No. C-981003, 2000 WL 955614 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23,
1999) (rejecting challenge to drug exclusion zone based on rights to peaceable assembly and
free travel); State v. Johnson, 988 P.2d 913 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting due process (notice)
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prostitution-related offenses,13 1 making them subject to criminal prosecution if
they are discovered in such areas, is also becoming a popular municipal strategy.
Municipalities thus avoid conflict with similar state laws by performing an
interstitial function of sorts, in accord with the spirit of home nle,139 filling
substantive gaps in perceived local social control needs.' 40 They enjoy this power,
as noted by one court, because "[a]n ordinance which merely enlarges upon the
provisions of a State statute by requiring more restrictions than the State
law... [creates no conflict] as long as the State statute is not exclusive." 141 In
State v. Rabon, for instance, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld a Seattle
law that made it a gross misdemeanor to possess "chako" sticks, finding no
conflict with the broader Washington state law banning a variety of other
weapons because state law did not specifically ban chako sticks.' 42 As noted by
the Rabon court, conflict does not occur merely because a local law broadens, or
in some respect is more specific than, the prohibitions contained in a related state
statute; conflict occurs only when state law expressly permits the targeted
behavior or otherwise denies enlargement power to locals. 43
challenge to drug exclusion zone); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting
double jeopardy challenge to drug exclusion zone). But see Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119
F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (enjoining Cincinnati's drug exclusion zone because it
violated the rights to association and movement and constituted double jeopardy).
13 See, eg., State v. Lhasawa, 979 P.2d 774 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting due process
challenge to prostitution free zone).
139 See Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266,274 (111. 1984):
Home rule... is predicated on the assumption that problems in which local governments
have a legitimate and substantial interest should be open to local solution and reasonable
experimentation to meet local needs, free from veto by voters and elected representatives
of other parts of the State who might disagree with the particular approach advanced by the
representatives of the locality involved or fail to appreciate the local perception of the
problem.
14 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 23.04, at 505 (observing that "a municipal
corporation has implied authority in police control to penalize by ordinance acts which are
already punishable by statute where the demands of municipal life seem to require more rigid
regulations than are required in the state at large").
141Atkins v. City of Tan-ant City, 369 So. 2d 322, 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); see also,
e.g., Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1297-98 (Kan. 1975) ("[W]here both an ordinance
and the statute are prohibitory and the only difference is that the ordinance goes further in its
prohibition but not counter to the prohibition in the statute, and the city does not attempt to
authorize by ordinance that which the legislature has forbidden, or forbid that which the
legislature has expressly authorized, there is no conflict."); City of Spokane v,.White, 10 P.3d
1095, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) ("A local ordinance does not conflict with state law merely
because one prohibits a wider scope of activity than the other does.").
4 727 P.2d 995,998-99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
t'oId. at 998; see also State v. S.L.S., 777 So. 2d 318 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (upholding
municipal ordinance prohibiting the giving of false statement to "any department or agency of
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Municipal power also extends beyond the basic authority to identify and
define crimes; it encompasses, quite naturally, sanctions. Local forfeiture laws
provide one such example. Perhaps the best-known local law is New York City's,
under which thousands of drug and alcohol-impaired drivers have forfeited their
motor vehicles. 44 This same strategy has been used by other localities to target
impaired drivers,' 45 as well as persons who patronize or solicit prostitutes,' 46
purchase illegal drugs, 147 or possess unregistered flrearms. 141 In Alaska, statutory
law expressly provides that municipalities may adopt vehicle forfeiture laws and
the city," in contrast to state law that merely prohibited providing a false statement to police);
People v. Gerardo, 220 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding municipal ordinance
prohibiting the carrying of knife in plain view, in contrast to state law that banned possession of
concealed knife); City and County of Denver v. Howard, 622 P.2d 568 (Colo. 1981) (upholding
municipal ordinance that prohibited interfering with police officer in "any way," in contrast to
state law that required use or threatened use of "violence, force, or physical interference"); State
v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding municipal ordinance that
prohibited public consumption of alcohol, in contrast to state law that proscribed disorderly
intoxication); City of Portland v. Long, 807 P.2d 815 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding municipal
ordinance that banned carrying loaded firearms, in contrast to state law that merely banned the
carrying of concealed firearms); City of Portland v. Marshall, 728 P.2d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)
(upholding municipal ordinance that banned discharge of firearms because state law banned
only unlawful carrying of firearms); City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas,
794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990) (upholding broad local animal control law because state lav
regulated only "vicious conduct"); City of Seattle v. Eze, 759 P.2d 366 (Wash. 1988)
(upholding municipal ordinance that criminalized "disorderly bus conduct" because law was
broader in scope than similar state law); City of Seattle v. Shin, 748 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App.
1988) (upholding municipal ordinance that criminalized parental failure to report child abuse
because state law relating to child abuse failed to expressly criminalize such behavior).
' See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); see also Alan Feuer,
Long after His Arrest, His Car is His Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2000, at B3 (noting that,
although Grinberg's case was voluntarily dismissed, it took him nineteen months to regain his
car); Jacob H. Fries, 4,000 Cars Seized in Effort to Halt Drunken Driving, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3,
2001, at B2 (noting number of cars seized under law since February 1999).
'45 See, e.g., McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155 (Alaska Ct. App.
2000).
'"See, e.g., Horton v. City of Oakland, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
'47 See, e.g., id; Property Clerk New York City Police Dep't v. Mason, 548 N.Y.S.2d 875
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). The Oakland forfeiture law at issue in Horton, unlike the similar state
law, required a mere preponderance of the evidence standard of proof (versus reasonable
doubt), did not require a conviction for the underlying drug offense, and contained no "innocent
owner" defense or community property exemption for the sole vehicle of the immediate family.
Horton, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375-76 n.9 (citing Oakland Cal. Ord. 12093 C.M.S., § 3-23.07).
Moreover, unlike under state law, the proceeds were divided evenly among local law
enforcement and prosecutors. Id. According to the Horton court, if the state desired "to preempt
local forfeiture ordinances of this kind, it [could have] express[ed] that intention by enacting
appropriate legislation." Id. at 375.
'4"See, e.g., People v. Jaudon, 718 N.E.2d 647 (111. App. Ct. 1999).
1432 [Vol. 62:1409
CRJMINAL LAW OF MUNICIPAL GOVERINANCE
that such laws need not be "consistent with [statutory law]"; 149 indeed, local laws
can be "harsher than their state-law counterparts. 150
Similarly, municipalities enjoy considerable power to specify the quantum of
incarceration upon conviction.1 5 1 With respect to concurrent exercises of criminal
authority, despite the general rule that localities cannot punish less than or in
excess of concurrent state criminal laws,'5 2 in fact very often they are permitted to
do so.15 3 As a result, when localities are more punitive, they can make criminal
149 McCorMick 999 P.2d at 167 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 2835.038 (Michie 2000)).
'50 Id. at 168.
1 See City of Chicago v. Roman, 705 N.E.2d 81, 87 (111. 1998) (noting that "[i]nherent in
defining a crime is prescribing a penalty... [A] prescribed penalty is as necessary to constitute
a crime as is its definition. A statute that prohibits conduct without a penalty is a nullity");
Commonwealth v. Cabell, 185 A.2d 611, 615-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) ("Local self-
government includes the power to legislate as well as to administer, and if it is to be effective it
must include the power to provide penalties for violation of its legislative mandates.").
152 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 17.15, at 444-51 (noting same); see, e.g., Edwards v.
State, 422 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (invalidating portion of local drug law that
imposed harsher punishment than identical state law); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d
926 (Ky. 1989) (invalidating local sodomy solicitation law that imposed twice the period of
imprisonment and fine than that authorized by identical state law); City of Portland v.
Dollarhide, 714 P.2d 220 (Or. 1986) (invalidating penalty provision of local prostitution law
that imposed mandatory minimum penalty not contained in identical state law); see also City of
Seattle v. Hogan, 766 P.2d 1134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (deeming it a violation of equal
protection when local law carried a greater penalty than identical state law because it afforded
charging authorities "unbridled discretion").
5 See People v. Wade, 757 P.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Colo. 1988) (stating that a "city's choice
of a sentencing scheme different from the state's is well within the city's constitutional power
as a home rule city.... [T]o find that a home rule city's penal ordinances must share the state's
so-called 'philosophy in sentencing' would diminish ... the independence and self-
determination vested in those cities by the constitution"); Hannan v. City of Minneapolis, 623
N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 2001) (stating "as long as the state has not expressly precluded local
regulation, there is no conflict when the state regulates a topic and the local government adds
additional regulations that provide consequences greater than those already provided").
For instances of courts upholding local authority to impose penalties greater than identical
state laws, see, for example, Brooks v. City of Birningham, 485 So. 2d 385 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986) (upholding local harassment law); State v. Crisp, 855 P.2d 795 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding prostitution law); State v. T.M., A.N. and D.N., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (upholding local juvenile curfew law); City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445
(La. 1995) (upholding local disorderly conduct law); Rossberg v. State, 74 A. 581 (Md. 1909)
(upholding local cocaine possession law); City of Niles v. Howard, 466 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio
1984) (upholding local simple marijuana possession law); City of Cleveland v. Barnes, 477
N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (upholding local concealed weapon law). For instances of
courts upholding local authority to impose lesser penalties, see, for example, Ford v. City of Hot
Springs, 743 S.W.2d 394 (Ark. 1988) (upholding local animal cruelty statute); City of Aurora v.
Martin, 507 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1973) (upholding local assault and battery law); City of Fargo v.
Little Brown Jug, 468 N.W.2d 392 (N.D. 1991) (upholding local law barring sale to underage
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those behaviors impliedly decriminalized by state government. 5 4 More subtly,
when localities impose less punitive sanctions for concurrent illegalities, they can
derive significant institutional benefits. This is perhaps most evident in the well-
established authority of municipalities to legislate with respect to "petty
crimes,' '1 55 as to which no federal constitutional right to a jury trial'16 or counsel' 57
extends. Accordingly, local governments can be constitutionally abstemious and
both save the significant resources associated with the exercise of such rights and
afford local prosecutors an expedient charging option'58 with enhanced plea
bargain leverage.'59 For individual defendants, this carries the immediate
consequences of possibly being deprived of a right to a jury of one's peers, and
drinkers); Harlow v. Clow, 223 P. 541 (Or. 1924) (upholding local vagrancy law).
1'4 InLouisiana and Ohio, for instance, localities are empowered to increase punishments
for concurrent laws so long as the degree of violation (misdemeanor) is not exceeded, in effect
affording them the power to "recriminalize" low-level offenses. See City of Baton Rouge v.
Williams, 661 So. 2d 445,450 (La. 1995); Howard, 466 N.E.2d at 541.
'55 See generally MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, §§ 27.32-.34, at 358-68.
According to the Supreme Court, an offense is "presumptively petty' if the maximum
period of incarceration is six months or less. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
538, 543-44 (1989). This benchmark, of course, has encouraged governments to pile on
additional sanctions, other than incarceration, when particular laws are violated. According to
the Blanton Court, the presumption of pettiness can be overcome only if the accused shows that
"any additional statutory penalties ... are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative
determination that the offense in question is a 'serious' one." Id. at 543. Applying this test, the
Court concluded that a DUI provision authorizing a maximum jail term of six months or forty-
eight hours of community service while wearing clothing signifying that the individual is a DUI
offender, plus requiring suspension of the offender's driver's licence suspension, the imposition
of a fine, and compelled alcohol abuse education, was not "serious." Id. at 543-44.
'6 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
ajury trial does not extend to "petty" offenses).
57 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that indigents must be appointed counsel
only when conviction results in "actual imprisonmenf').
158 See, e.g., State v. Bowers, 498 N.W.2d 202 (S.D. 1993) (upholding denial ofjury trial
in relation to prosecution under local law for "disorderly assembly," carrying a maximum
penalty of six months imprisonment, despite identical state law carrying a maximum one-year
term); City of Casper v. Fletcher, 916 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1996) (upholding right of local
prosecutor to choose between charging under local battery law, as opposed to identical state
law, when only state law permitted right to jury trial). But see Hardamon v. City of Boulder,
497 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Colo. 1972) (striking down local law that denied right to jury trial,
finding it "illogical and without reason to say that a defendant charged in a state or non-home
rule municipal court should be permitted a jury trial, whereas if he is similarly charged in a
home rule court he should be denied ajury trial").
159 This appeal stems in part from the constitutional latitude enjoyed by prosecutors to
aggregate two or more petty offense charges into a single prosecution, which, when combined,
threaten more than "petty" punishment, yet do not trigger constitutional jury trial rights. See
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) (holding that no right to a jury trial attaches in a
single prosecution for several petty offenses combined).
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being deprived of access to counsel.16 Moreover, such uncounseled convictions
can be used to enhance punishment for any subsequent convictions, potentially
resulting in substantial increases in prison time.
16 1
The power of localities to specify sanctions as to non-concurrent crimes is
even more significant. With respect to this expansive realm of offenses, localities
can prescribe punishments under the felony level; 162 they can also impose
mandatory minimum sentences,1 63 and even require confiscation and destruction
of personal property.164 Of course, when they independently law make, localities
enjoy the same institutional savings identified above with respect to "petty
Crimes.s1
165
Finally, home rule authority empowers municipalities to self-regulate in the
procedural realm. This power can include the withholding of certain procedural
rights otherwise applicable in criminal proceedings' 66 and the imposition of limits
"0 The negative consequences attending lack of counsel, in particular, for low-level
offenses have been well-known for some time. As the Court noted in Argersinger v. Hamlin:
"[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court
with all charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel." 407
U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (quoting AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR
MISDEMEANANTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970)).
161 See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (holding that uncounseled
convictions can be used for enhancement purposes, even though only later conviction carries
sentence involving "actual imprisonmenf); cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227-28
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that "[a]n uncounseled conviction does not become
more reliable merely because the accused has been validly convicted of a subsequent offense").
162 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 23.06, at 512.
'63 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Roman, 705 N.E.2d 81 (111. 1998) (upholding mandatory
minimum for violation of local law prohibiting assault on elderly person, despite more flexible
sentencing allowed by state law); City of Detroit v. Recorder's Court Traffic and Ordinance
Judge, 304 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding mandatory minimum for violation of
local prostitution law, despite more flexible state sentencing law); City of Columbus v. Kemper,
610 N.E.2d 1194 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (upholding local sentencing scheme resulting in
mandatory minimum sentence for drunk driving, when no such minimum would arise under
state law because prior convictions counted differently). But see City of Portland v. Dollarhide,
714 P.2d 220 (Or. 1986) (invalidating mandatory minimum for violation of local prostitution
law when none existed under state law); City of North Charleston v. Harper, 410 S.E.2d 569
(S.C. 1991) (invalidating local law that imposed mandatory minimum jail sentence for simple
marijuana possession, unlike state law which afforded discretion to sentencing court).
'r See, e.g., City of Portland v. Marshall, 728 P.2d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding
local law that permitted the confiscation and destruction of firearm used in violation of city law
banning discharge of firearms).
165See, e.g., State v. Weltzin, 639 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 2001) (deeming permissible a
prosecution for violation of local underage drinking law, which was closely related to state law,
despite fact that local law did not trigger jury trial right).
166See, e.g., R.E.N. v. City of Colorado Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)
(holding that localities are permitted to eschew state procedural safeguards, such as the right to
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on the right to appeal.' 67 Moreover, local authority typically entails the use of
"municipal courts,"' 6 the summary and "slap-dash methods" of which have been
a source of concern for decades.
69
As the foregoing should make clear, municipalities today wield considerable
power in the battle against crime and disorder, and the trend signals a continued
assertiveness. As noted by a leading treatise:
Without doubt the trend disclosed by the cases, and also the trend of
constitutional and statutory enactments, is one of liberality in allowing municipal
power to create and punish for offenses upon general municipal police power,
regardless of whether the offense is theoretically conceived as one against the
state or against the municipality. 170
Viewed in historical context, this assertiveness should cause neither surprise nor
special concern for, as discussed earlier, local governments played a preeminent
role in governance during much of the nation's history,171 including the enactment
of criminal laws.' 72 As Professor Novak has observed, the "decentralized, loosely
counsel, in prosecutions ofjuveniles in municipal courts for violations of local law).
'67See SANDS ET AL., supra note 130, § 11.33, at 143-47 (discussing limits on right to
appeal).
16p See id. § 11.28, at 124-31 (discussing variety of such courts and summary procedures
employed).
169 See Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot Changes in the Administration of Criminal
Justice during the Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 590-91 (1937); see also Baldasar v.
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 228 n.2 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing concern over
application of "assembly-line justice" in municipal courts).
In Ohio, this involves the use of "mayor's courts" wherein local chief executives are
personally authorized to adjudicate alleged violations of municipal laws and to impose
punishments. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (upholding statutory grant of judicial and
executive functions and powers to mayoral offices). The Tumey Court did, however, invalidate
the particular scheme in question because the mayor had a "direct personal, substantial
pecuniary interest" in the proceedings, receiving as a supplement to his regular salary specified
fees and costs in the event of a conviction. Id. at 523; see also DePiero v. City of Macedonia,
180 F.3d 770, 780-82 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding due process violation because of "broad reach of
executive authority" enjoyed by particular mayor).
For an in-depth discussion of the "minor judiciary" of Philadelphia in the mid-I 800s,
characterized by a "fee system" in which aldermen personally benefitted from the adjudication
of arrests for acts involving minor public disorder, see ALLEN STENBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, 17, 26-33, 121-30, 173-
80(1989).
170 See MCQULLIN, supra note 23, § 23.02, at 502.
171 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
'72See, e.g., Main v. McCarty, 15 Ill. 442-(1854) (city law banning operation of a"tippling
house" on the Sabbath); White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550 (1860) (city law authorizing arrest for
violation of local law forbidding private auctions in public spaces). See generally NORTON T.
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structured state coupled with strong traditions of private prosecution and local
police regulation allowed for a stunning degree of diversity, experimentation, and
discretion" in the municipal power to effectuate social control. 73 Characteristic of
the times, as well, was a distinctly communal conception of individual liberties.
Such liberties were "routinely subordinated to the local police powers necessary
to secure the moral fiber and general welfare of a community."1 74 This
orientation, and the predominant role of local government in regulating the daily
lives of Americans, however, experienced a radical transformation in the wake of
the Civil War and the constitutional amendments it spawned, emphasizing
individual rights and governmental centralization. 75 After a several-decade-long
hiatus, Americans now appear ready to return local government to its major role
in regulating and disciplining the affairs of daily life.'76 Not coincidentally, with
this return have come strenuous appeals (even-perhaps principally-from
HORR & ALTON A. BEMis, A TREATISE ON MUNICIPAL POLICE ORDINANCES passim (1887)
(citing other examples); Horace L. Wilgus, Arrests Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541,
550-52 (1924) (same).
173 NOVAK, supra note 63, at 155. During that time, "[s]tate legislatures delegated open-
ended authority to municipalities to deal with moral hazards' Id; see also ERNST FREUND,
POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 144-46, 156-59 (1904);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 107-42 (1993)
(noting same).
For discussions of criminal law-making by locals in earlier times, see BRADLEY CHAPIN,
CRmINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERCA 1606-1660,9-13, 125-30 (1983); JON C. TEAFORD,
THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS OF MODERN URBAN GOVERNMENT, 1650-
1825 passim (1975); William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the
Revolutionary Era:An HistoricalPerspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450,451-56 (1967).
'74NOVAK, supra note 63, at 169. Novak adds that "[flrom a twentieth-century
perspective, these ideas and practices seem arbitrary and even scary ... But these notions were
the essence of nineteenth-century conceptions of local self-government." Ia at 169-70.
175Id. at 170. In the wake of the Civil War, Novak observes, American traditions of local
self-govemance and saluspopuli gave way to:
[The simultaneous pursuit of two seemingly antagonistic tendencies-the centralization
ofpower and the individualization of subjects. The two would be ultimately mediated (and,
again simultaneously, promoted) by the constitutionalization of law. By the early decades
of the twentieth century, a society legally and politically oriented around the relationship of
individual subjects to a central nation-state had substantially replaced the well-regulated
society's preference for articulating the roles of associative citizens in a confederated
republic.
Id. at 240-41. In short, in the mid-to-late nineteenth century there occurred a "decidedly upward
shift in decision-making power" with regard to police and regulatory policies. Id. at 241.
176 1n addition to the re-imposition of local authority in the realm of substantive law,
discussed at length here, recent decentralization efforts such as "community prosecution,"
suggest a strong link to the past. STEINBERG, supra note 169, at 17 (discussing the role played
by local aldermen, located in neighborhood offices throughout the city, who adjudicated the
majority of criminal cases for much of the nineteenth century in Philadelphia).
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academic quarters) that concern for "rights" should not eclipse the
commonweal,' 7 and that the local, democratic origins of the laws should enjoy
deference.1
78
Thus, in many respects, a central strain of the American modus operandi of
social control can be said to have come full circle. Municipalities across the
country are now exercising their right to criminalize a wide range of behaviors,
well beyond the traditional constitutionally contested domains of vagrancy and
loitering, 79 consistent with the dynamic quality and responsiveness historically
associated with localism. 80 Next, the article examines several of the most
important ramifications of this shift.
III. THE MUNICIPAL POWER TO ENACT CRIMINAL LAWS: A PosinvE
GOOD?
When municipal governments enact criminal laws, they avail themselves of
just one of several means at their disposal to regulate behavior within their
boundaries. To a considerable extent, municipal criminal laws can be said to
resemble zoning provisions; a conventional local method of regulating space and
maintaining order."' The resort by municipalities to criminal laws in particular,
however, raises unique concerns that warrant special consideration, as discussed
next.
'n See, e.g., AMrrAi ETzIONI, THE SPIRr OF CoMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
THE COMMUNrTARIAN AGENDA (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
,
78 See supra notes 4-5, 41-45 and accompanying text.
179See supra notes 87-167 and accompanying text (citing and discussing large variety of
criminal laws enacted by cities); see also Ellickson, Chronic Misconduct, supra note 42, at
1176 (referring to "the crackdown ordinances of the 1990s").
"0 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 24.03, at 14:
[Police power] is not something which is rigid and definitely fixed; on the contrary, in its
very nature it must be considerably elastic within limits in order to meet the changing and
shifting conditions which from time to time arise through the increase and shift of
population and the flux and complexity of commercial and social relations.... [i]t copes
with the new as it has with the old and justifies measures in the present that it has not
justified in the past
See also id. § 24.08, at 25 ("[Tihe power is not confined with respect to the subjects upon which
it operates by narrow limits of precedents based on conditions of a past era; rather, it is
sufficiently flexible to meet changing conditions that call for revised or new regulations to
promote the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.").
181 It warrants mention, however, that cities employed criminal laws well before the advent
of zoning, the latter being a distinctly twentieth century innovation. See JESSE DUKEMiNIER &
JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 1115 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that until the twentieth century, urban
land use controls were privatized, "piecemeal[,] and limited").
1438 [Vol. 62:1409
CRIMINAL LA W OFMUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE
A. The Proliferation of Criminal Laws and Their Consequences
As Thomas Paine once aptly observed, "in America the law is king";1 8 2 this is
surely no less true today as evidenced by modem America's penchant for
criminal laws in particular.' 3 Criminal laws themselves serve both expressive and
instrumental functions. In expressive terms, the laws give concrete expression to
acceptable standards of decorum and behavior,'84 as determined by a given
political body at a given place and time.18 5 More significant to the daily lives of
most Americans, however, is the instrumental role of criminal laws. In
'22 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND THE CRISIS 41 (Doubleday Dolphin ed. 1960)
(1776). For more modem recognitions of this orientation, see generally LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
"' For extended discussions of contemporary America's particularly acute fixation on
criminalization, see David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, Mass
Imprisonment in America, in 3 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 5 (2001); David Cole, As Freedom
Advances: The Paradox of Severity in American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455
(2001).
184Legal expressiveness is now the subject of a burgeoning literature, drawing
predominantly from rational choice theory and law and economics, which focuses on the role of
social norms in curtailing anti-social behavior. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997); Tracey L. Meares &
Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms oo) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 805
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On The Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996). Under this view, "[i]ndividuals are motivated to obey the law not only by their
perception of the costs and benefits of crime, but also by their understanding of what breaking
the law will signify about who they are and what they value." Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing
Criminal Law. Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1859,1860 (1999).
Whatever value expressiveness might have in the abstract, it has little to recommend in the
context of the low-level local criminal laws mainly discussed here. While criminal laws
targeting such non-serious offenses as open container laws, jaywalking, or loitering might
signal a community's displeasure with "disorder," or signal disapproval of gang membership in
particular (as in Morales), it strains credulity to say that the laws are of such moral magnitude as
to condemn transgressors in terms of "who they are and what they value." Indeed, as discussed
infra, too often such laws constitute little more than a known, pretextual legal basis for police to
arrest and search, skewing whatever "expressive" function the laws might have on their own
individualized terms. For commentary critical of expressive and social norm theory more
generally, see, for example, Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms,
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000); Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old is New Again ": Early
Reflections on the "New Chicago School," 1998 WIS. L. REV. 579.
"" See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and
the Problem of Crime Con trol, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 346 (1984) (observing that governmental
decisions in criminal lawmaking generate a "struggle [that] is, in essence, political rather than
moral').
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instrumental terms, criminal laws provide government agents the means to
immediately intervene in citizens' affairs. Upon "reasonable suspicion" that an
offense has been or is being committed, police can "stop" a citizen;18 6 with
"probable cause," police can execute a full "custodial arrest," with or without a
warrant, regardless of the minor nature or lack of seriousness of the underlying
offense.
187
Accordingly, with more laws come more opportunities for seizures of
citizens by police, making the sheer proliferation of criminal laws a significant
social development. The intrusive consequences of this authority are evidenced in
New York's ongoing "zero tolerance" and "quality of life" policing strategies,' 8
where the state Attorney General determined that the city's police executed
roughly 175,000 "stop and frisks" during a recent fifteen-month period,'89 a
significant proportion of which were for suspected violations of "quality-of-life"
offenses. 19° Although the study did not collect data on "arrests" in New York, '9
other sources underscore the City's frequent resort to arrest for low-level offenses,
with such arrests increasing dramatically in number during the first five years of
zero tolerance policing.' 92 Moreover, with this augmented authority there often
"" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
187 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001).
. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion
and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Wayne A. Logan, Policing in an Intolerant Society, 35 CRIM. L.
BULL. 334 (1999). It is worth noting that aggressive, "zero tolerance" oriented police campaigns
did not originate in New York with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. In the 1850s, for instance,
Philadelphia's nativist mayor directed his police to aggressively patrol and arrest for minor
offenses, resulting in massive increases in arrest rates. See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, 172-73 (1989).
189 See ATTY. GEN. OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICES 107-09 (Dec. 1, 1999),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop-frisk/stop-frisk.html (Dec.1, 1999) [hereinafter
STOP AND FRISK REPORT] (specifying a total of 174,919 "stops" in New York City during the
period of January 1, 1998, through March 31, 1999).
'9Id. at 58 (specifying that the articulated basis in almost 18,000 stops related to such
offenses).
'9' See id at 57-58.
192 See Div. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INDICATORS: NEW YORK
CITY, 1993-1998, at http'//www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/gi/intemet/areastatareastat.cgi
(last modified Aug. 8, 2001) (noting increase from 129,403 misdemeanor arrests in 1993 to
215,155 in 1998); see also Kevin Flynn, Lower Morale, Yes. But Apathy?, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2000, at 25 (noting that such arrests increased by twelve percent in 2000 over 1999);
William K. Rashbaum, Overtime Program Credited for Crime Drop, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2000, at B3 (noting that two-thirds of arrests during the year were for quality-of-life offenses,
pursuant to Operation Condor, a hyper-aggressive street patrol initiative); David Rohde,
1440 [Vol. 62:1409
CRIMINAL LAW OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE
comes evidence of discriminatory applications of the law, as seen within minority
communities in New York 3 and elsewhere, 9 4 practices that are largely immune
to constitutional challenge and redress.' 95
In addition, as has been recognized for decades, 9 6 criminal laws represent
Crackdown on Minor Offenses Swamps NYC Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, at Al (stating
that criminal courts have been "overwhelmed by a flood of cases" for lower-level offenses);
David Rohde, In Teeming Courts, Finding Strength in Family Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000,
at Al (describing the impact on middle-class families whose members have been ensnared by
aggressive "quality-of-life" policing when arrested for petty offenses); David Rohde, Police
Arrest Smokers in Subways, and Lawyers Object, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at Al (recounting
recent arrests for selling tamales on the street without a license and smoking in the subway).
193 See STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 189, at 95 (noting that African-Americans
were six times, and Hispanics four times more likely than Whites to be stopped and frisked by
City police); David Barstow, View from New York Streets: No Retreat by Police, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2000, at A28 (chronicling marked increases in arrests for minor offenses in poor and
minority areas despite decreases in reported crime).
194 See James Walsh & Dan Browning, Presumed Guilty Until Proved Innocent, STAR-
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 23, 2000, at Al (noting significantly higher arrest rates in
Minneapolis for African-Americans with regard to broad array of minor offenses); see also
MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 105-06
(1995) (observing that police street detentions are more likely in poor, socially disorganized
neighborhoods because illegal activity takes place outside rather than inside); Anthony R.
Harris & James A. W. Shaw, Lookingfor Patterns: Race, Class, and Crime, in CRIMINOLOGY:
A CONTEMPORARY HANDBOOK 129, 135 (Joseph F. Sheley ed., 3d ed. 2000) ("In arrests for
less-serious non-Index crimes, there is ample reason to believe the police role may well be more
proactive than reactive, resulting in the overarrest of Aflican-Americans compared to whites.");
cf David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotype and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and
Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296 (2001) (discussing recent studies
from several jurisdictions reflecting race-based stops and searches of citizens).
15The Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), held that the
Fourth Amendment does not limit discriminatory seizures by police. The Court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, however, does. Id. at 813 (stating that "the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendmenf). It is widely acknowledged that equal
protection challenges in such cases, however, are virtually impossible to sustain. See Andrew
W. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in
the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 559, 569-72 (1999) (discussing decisions rejecting
such challenges); Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Terry, Race, and Judicial Integrity: The
Court and Suppression During the War on Drugs, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1323, 1329-34
(1998) (same).
196 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
437-82 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965) (surveying widespread use of arrest for minor offenses
to uncover evidence and suppress incipient social disorder). Reflecting on the landmark studies
of the American Bar Foundation of the 1950s and 1960s, of which Professor LaFave's seminal
work was a part, Professor Herman Goldstein more recently observed: "The substantial police
involvement in an activity like traffic control, through the arrests made and the searches
conducted, was used in various ways to control serious crime." HERMAN GOLDSTEIN,
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more than ends in themselves. Alleged violations of serious and non-serious
criminal laws alike afford police the tools to defain citizens and make further
invasive investigations. 197 Upon "stopping" a citizen, and with the reasonable
belief that the citizen is armed, police can conduct a "frisk" for weapons. 198 Upon
"arresting" a citizen, police are automatically permitted to conduct a full bodily
search, again, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the underlying offense.199
Any evidence or contraband discovered, whether or not related to the initial basis
for arrest, can then be used by the government to prosecute, with the arrest in
effect serving as an investigative fulcrum to increase criminal liability (sometimes
radically).200 Even short of arrest, alleged violations provide police a basis to
conduct investigative "fishing expeditions,"20' the obvious appeal of which is
greatly enhanced by the reality that police can exercise their discretion not to
Confronting the Complexity of the Policing Function, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
TENSION BETWEEN INDiviDUALIZATION AND UNFORMrrY 32 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J.
Remington eds., 1993).
'97For discussions of the well-known use of traffic laws as tools to serve broader
investigative ends, often with discriminatory motives, see David A. Harris, Car Wars: The
Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 559-60 (1998);
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 344-54 (1998). For
discussions of racially discriminatory application of low-level laws more generally, see Dorothy
E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J.
CRIM. LAW& CRIMNOLOGY 775 (1999).
'9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
19 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). See generally Wayne A. Logan,
An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 381 (2001).
2 See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding
conviction for illegal firearm possession based on arrest for riding bicycle on sidewalk, resulting
in fifteen-year prison term); State v. S.L.S., 777 So. 2d 318 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (upholding
drug possession conviction based on arrest for violation of law criminalizing the provision of
false statement to government officer); State v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (upholding drug possession conviction based on evidence derived from arrest for
drinking a can of beer in public); People v. Pantusco, 484 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
(upholding burglary conviction based on evidence derived from arrest for violation of open
container law); People v. Whitted, 718 N.Y.S2d 162 (N.Y. Crim Ct. 2000) (upholding drug
possession conviction based on evidence seized as result of arrest for littering); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (upholding drug possession conviction based
on evidence derived from arrest for urinating in public); McConnell v. State, No. 14-99-00887-
CR, 2001 WL 8344 (rex. App. Jan. 4,2001) (upholding drug possession conviction resulting in
forty-year prison term based on arrest for public urination); State v. Greene, 983 P.2d 1190
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding drug possession conviction based on evidence seized
pursuant to arrest for violation of "pedestrian interference" ordinance).
201 See STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 189, at 116 (noting that New York police as a
whole stopped eight citizens for every arrest made, while the aggressive "Street Crimes Unit"
worked at a fifteen-to-one stop-to-arrest ratio).
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arrest, thus avoiding the institutional costs associated with formal arrest and
prosecution (e.g., police time and salaries, jail costs).202 With news of decreasing
crime rates, yet concomitant increasing pressure on police leaders to "show
results,"203 the concern assumes ever-greater salience. This is especially so given
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, where the
Court expressly condoned warrantless arrests for "very minor" (even non-jailable)
offenses.204 As a result of the Court's decision, as long as probable cause exists
that a violation occurred, the sole limit on police arrest authority is that the act of
physical arrest not be conducted in an 'extraordinary manner, unusually harmful
to [the citizen's] privacy or ... physical interests."' 2 5
In sum, municipal criminal codes have greater instrumental significance than
initially meets the eye: they at once furnish an immediate basis for police to
terminate particular behaviors, and they serve as tools to achieve broader
investigatory and enforcement ends. Municipal laws thus significantly augment
the government's capacity to stop and frisk, and to arrest and search citizens,
thereby increasing the already prodigious menu of state criminal laws at the
disposal of police. 6 The laws play a direct role in increasing the incidence of
2o Evidence in New York City, however, suggests that police are not shy about executing
full-blown custodial arrests for minor offenses, as permitted by state law. The result has been
huge increases in the declination rates by local prosecutors. See Ford Fessenden & David
Rohde, Dismissed Before Reaching Court, FlawedArrests Rise in New York N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
23, 1999, at Al. This practice is itself troubling, suggesting an abuse of the government's
Fourth Amendment authority. See Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth
Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing national prevalence of arrests for non-serious
crimes without prosecution and arguing that the practice violates the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
203 Logan, supra note 188, at 345 (arguing that "police administrators now have an
institutional, volume incentive to make 'bigger' cases on the basis of custodial arrests and
searches premised on petty crimes"); see also Barry Loveday, Managing Crime: Police Use of
Crime Data as an Indicator of Effectiveness, 28 INT'L J. Soc. L. 215, 216 (2000) (noting that
"[p]olice forces... are now judged on performance criteria, which embraces [sic] their success
in reducing crime!); Howie Carr, Arresting Memo Puts State Cops in a Pinch, BOSTON
HERALD, Oct. 21, 1998, at 1 (discussing state police internal memorandum demanding
"corrective action ... [to] increase the level of activity" because arrests are a "valid indicator"
of performance); Larry Celona & Linda Massarella, "Collar" Shortage Puts Queens Cops in
Doghouse, NEW YORK POST, June 11, 1998, at 12 (addressing memorandum from a police
supervisor threatening that officers who fail to make ample arrests will not receive vacation
days).
2m 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001).
205 See id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
206 This growth of arrest authority, it should be noted, is typically facilitated by state
statutory law that expressly empowers local police to execute warrantless arrests for low-level
offenses. See, eg., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(2)(a) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2001)
(authorizing warrantless arrest of any person suspected of committing a "petty offense"); TEx.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2001) (authorizing warrantless
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acknowledged personal indignities 20 7 and negative practical consequences
experienced by citizens, not to mention providing grist for the nation's
skyrocketing imprisonment rates, 209 which lead the world2 1 ° The laws are always
arrest for "any offense').207 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S.1, 24-25 (1968)) (noting that "[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing... constitutes a
severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
558 (1979) (observing that bodily searches "instinctively give[ ] us the most pause"); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (deeming an arrest "a
serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent"); Terry,
392 U.S. at 16-17 (deeming it "simply fantastic to urge that such a [stop and frisk] procedure
performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless ... is a 'petty indignity.' It
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment").
2 See, e.g., Michael Cooper, You're Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at Al
(noting that transport to the precinct house can take in excess of four hours, and that individuals
in New York have been "held in cells for more than sixty hours waiting to see a judge for
crimes like fare-beating, sleeping on park benches and drinking beer in public'). Officials in
New York City, until recently, strip-searched persons arrested for minor offenses. The practice
was discontinued as a result of a successful class action civil rights suit. See Benjamin Weiser,
New York Will Pay $50 Million in 50,000 Illegal Stnip-Searches, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2001, at
Al.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 2000 1 (2001) (noting that from 1990 to 2000 the nation's population in prisons
and jails grew by 783,157 inmates, a 5.6% annual rate of increase). Over this same period, the
national per capita incarceration rate rose from 458 inmates per 100,000 residents to 702
inmates per 100,000 residents. Id. at 3. At mid-year 2000, the total number of persons
incarcerated in state, federal, and local facilities reached almost two million. Id at 2. The
number of persons in the nation's jails, alone, rose thirty-two percent during the period 1993-
1999. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF JAILS 1999 1 (2001). Since 1983, the jail
population has more than doubled. Id.
The exorbitant rise has been driven in significant part by arrests of young African-
American males, the disproportionate target of urban policing efforts directed at low-level
crimes. See Bernard Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn ": Implications for Research
Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC.
REV. 179, 201-02 (2000) (observing that "a law enforcement strategy that emphasizes
misdemeanor arrests has a disproportionate effect on minorities .... The brute fact is that the
decision to arrest for misdemeanors results in the arrest of many minorities"). See generally
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIvE
YEARS LATER 1 (1995); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN
MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996).210 See THE SENTENCING PROJECr, U.S. SURPASSES RUSSIA As WORLD LEADER IN RATE OF
INCARCERATION 1 (2000), at http://www.sentencing project.org/brief7USVRSUS.pdf (ast
visited Aug. 24,2001).
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growing in number, only rarely being repealed or invalidated, a adversely
affecting individuals212 and entire communities. 2 13 Moreover, minor offense
convictions can result in deportation for resident aliens214 and serve as the basis
for sentencing enhancements for any subsequent conviction under state and
federal sentencing guidelines.
215
Beyond the tangible human consequences, the proliferation of criminal laws
at the local level potentially fosters negative sociological effects that are at once
more subtle and pervasive. By definition, those who violate the criminal law are
"outsiders," permitting self-identification of law-abiding citizens as community
"insiders." 216 British criminologist Adam Crawford recently characterized the
211 As Professor Stuntz observes, "[c]riminal law is not static; like other areas of law, it is
constantly changing. Unlike other areas of law, it tends to change in one direction only
legislatures regularly add new crimes but rarely repeal old ones." William J. Stuntz,
Commentary, O. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114
HARV. L. REV. 842, 854 (2001); see also Robert Mimer, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 745-46 (1996) (discussing the experience in Arizona
where legislators, revising the state criminal code, refused to repeal existing statutory sex crimes
because they were reluctant to appear lenient on sex crimes, even when the laws had become
outmoded or superfluous). But see Pam Belluck, Chicago Looks at Past to Purge Its Stale
Statutes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at Al (discussing unusual effort by Chicago to review
"foot-thick city code books" prompted by constitutional challenge to aged "anti-mask' law).
212 For individuals these consequences include, inter alia, the loss of physical freedom
often for long periods of time, disruption of and damage to family relations and work
opportunities. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Needfor Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153 (1999); Kathryn Casa,
Prisons: The New Growth Industry, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., July 2, 1999, at 15. The experience
of arrest forjuveniles, in particular, appears to have particularly adverse personal consequences,
accounting for marked increases in the risk of recidivism. See Malcolm Klein, Labeling Theory
andDelinquency Policy: An Empirical Test, 13 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 47 (1986).
213 For discussions of the deleterious socio-economic effects on communities, see John
Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children,
Communities, and Prisoners, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH-PRISONS 121
(Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999); Todd R. Clear et al., Incarceration and the
Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 335
(2001); Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and
Social Consequences, 65 FED. PROBATION 3 (June 2001); Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear,
Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory, 36
CRIMINOLOGY 441 (1998).214 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope ofProposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1941-46 (2000) (noting same
and citing instances).
215 See e.g., United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2000) (enhancing federal
penalty for possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute based on prior local conviction for
discharging an air rifle).216 See EMILE DURKHEIM, ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simpson
trans., MacMillan 1933) (1893) (observing that "[c]rime brings together upright consciences
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process as one whereby "[c]ommunity members recognize themselves as a
collective, as 'us' in contradistinction to 'them'.... The offender is viewed
primarily as an 'outsider' against whom the 'community' needs to defend
itself.... There is no sense of offenders being internal to, and members of,
com unities. 217 Crawford asserts that:
[I]n seeking to construct communities around crime we may be creating
parochial and exclusive communities with intolerant values. Crime as an issue
inherently bifurcates people, behaviours, and actions into the "acceptable" and
the "unacceptable": the normal and the pathological.... The meaning of
"community" may then become saturated with that which "we" are not, as much
as that which "we" are or share in common. It is not hard to see how such a sense
of "us and them [sic]," particularly if constructed at a local geographical level,
paves the way for those who have the resources to retreat behind "gated
communities."2
18
In short, to borrow a phrase coined by Gerald Frug, the process of "community
building" by means of criminal laws can result in the "building of walls."219 Or, as
William Dixon has put it even more metaphorically, building "community" on
the basis of crime concerns "is Janus-faced: it excludes as it includes."2 0
In more concrete terms, reflexive resort to the criminal law can undercut the
salutary goal of creating strong, sustainable, and inter-reliant communities. Rather
than cultivating mutual understanding and identification, criminal laws can breed
distrust and antagonism among residents221and serve to discourage pursuit of
and concentrates them"); KAI T. ERIKSON, THE WAYWARD PURIrANS: A STUDY IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1966) (observing generally that labeling others as criminal or
deviant serves to educate others and foster mutual identification).2 17 ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF CRIME: APPEALS TO COMMUNITY
AND PARTNERSHIPS 159-60 (1997); see also id. at 163 (noting that under such a regime
"offenders are conceptualized as strangers who inhabit public spaces").
211Id. at 292-93; see also id. at 289 (asserting that the use of crime as a method of
community building hastens a "localism achieved, largely, through the power to exclude").219 See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS (1999).
220 DAVID DIXON, LAW IN POLICING: LEGAL REGULATION AND POLICE PRACTICES 315
(1997). Dixon adds: "The exclusion of those not defined as being of 'the community' is
particularly problematic in its re-articulation of distinctions drawn by police cultures between
the respectable and the unrespectable; between those who count and those who do not." Id.
22 See CRAWFORD, supra note 217, at 169 (stating that with increasing criminalization,
"communities are less likely to be open, tolerant, and inclusive of values and differences, and
more likely to be exclusive, parochial, and prejudiced"); Rose & Clear, supra note 213, at 467
(asserting that "overreliance on formal controls may increase disorganization by impeding other
forms of control"). On the toxic effects of "governing through crime" more generally, see
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 171 (Lawrence Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997).
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more benign efforts that might hold promise for long-term organic improvement
of communities. 22 This is especially so if the laws are perceived as unfair.223 The
criminal law, whatever else it promises, typically fails to deliver anything but a
one-shot, fleeting remedy, as countless ineffectual "police sweeps" over the
course of history attest, 24 and empirical findings highlight.225 Finally, consistent
2nSee WILLIAM DELEON-GRANADOs, TRAVELS THROUGH CRIME AND PLACE:
COMMUNnY BUILDING AS CRIME CONTROL 141 (1999) (observing that the human potential of
communities is "co-opted" by a reflexive criminal justice approach; with such an approach "the
powerful informal solutions residing in the abilities found only in those
communities ... dissipate or never receive the proper validation and resources to make them
successful').
Law enforcement in general requires less empathy and creativity, it is also typically not
wanting for funds, as evidenced by the federal government's recent infusion of millions of
dollars in grant money for expansion of local police ranks. See JEFFREY A. ROTH & JOSEPH F.
RYAN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE COPS PROGRAM AFTER 4 YEARS-NATIONAL
EVALUATION (2000) (describing the origin and evolution of the Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services and the provision of massive federal funds for increases in local police ranks).
2 See infra notes 268-277 and accompanying text (discussing empirical work of
Professor Tom Tyler and others suggesting that when citizens believe the govemment is acting
fairly and with benevolent motives, they are more likely to comply voluntarily with the law and
legal authority).
2 See, e.g., ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CrrY POLICE 187-88 (1977) (recounting
ineffective "saturation" efforts by police in 1950s San Francisco); see also Egon Bittner, The
Police and Skid-Row: A Study of Peace-Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699, 710-11 (1967)
(discussing survey results indicating that veteran police viewed "minor offense arrests" as "poor
craftsmanship").
The approach is also very often at cross purposes with the progressive goals (if not always
the methods) of "community policing." See ROBERT R. FRIEDMAN, COMMUNITY POLICING 92
(1992) (noting that community policing seeks to forge a trust-based relationship between
officers and citizens characterized by a sense of shared responsibility). See generally WESLEY
G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYL passim (1997)
(discussing role of community policing officers as being "coproducers" of safety). Despite its
ostensibly benign and inclusive orientation, community policing of late has been criticized for
succumbing to many of the same pitfalls associated with traditional policing methods, including
a disregard for "community" values and involvement, and reflexive resort to criminal laws. See
generally WILLIAM LYONS, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY POLICING: REARRANGING THE
POWERTO PUNISH (1999).
2'5 Based on their work in troubled inner-city Chicago neighborhoods, for instance,
Professors Sampson and Raudenbush recently concluded that while manifestations of public
disorder might encourage individuals to move from particular areas, they have no direct effect
on crime. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
DISORDER IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS--DOES IT LEAD TO CRIME? 5 (2001). Even more
important, the authors' findings "strongly suggest that policies intended to reduce crime by
eradicating disorder solely through tough law enforcement tactics are misdirected .... The
active ingredients of crime seem to be structural disadvantages and low levels of collective
efficacy more than disorder." Id Rather than "police-led crackdowns on disorder," the authors
assert, local leaders should focus on efforts that instill "collective efficacy by creating and
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with the long-standing concern regarding "over criminalization' more
generally,226 criminalizing behaviors that otherwise might be deemed innocuous,
or worthy of less forceful (read: civil) condemnation, threatens trivialization of the
"stigma" associated with the criminal law and its sanctions.227
B. The Specter ofLocal Oppressiveness
Beyond the untoward effects associated with the application of municipal
criminal laws, in their sheer volume, the substance of the laws in their particulars
strengthening social ties and increasing awareness of the residents' commitment to their
neighborhood." Id. at 5-6.
226 For one of the first, and most trenchant, examinations of this phenomenon, see Sanford
H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17 (1968). As Professor
George Fletcher recently observed, "[t]he tendency at the close of the twentieth century is to
focus not on the necessity that the guilty atone but on the pragmatic utility of using criminal
sanctions to influence social behavior." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL
LAW 203 (1998).
227 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMNAL SANCrION 365 (1968) (noting
that the "criminal sanction is the best available device we have for dealing with gross and
immediate harms and threats of harm. It becomes less useful as the harms become less gross
and immediate"); Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 405 (1958) (observing that "crime is... conduct, which, if duly shown to have taken
place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community'); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 481 n.64 (1997) (observing that many regulatory offenses have been made criminal in
order to trigger the "moral stigmatization that criminal liability brings but civil liability does
not").
Today's impulse to criminalize, it should be noted, is distinctly at odds with broader
criminal law reform efforts of the recent past, in particular that of the American Law Institute in
the 1950s and 1960s in creating the Model Penal Code. As the Code's Chief Reporter, Herbert
Wechsler, stated:
[T]he penal law should not be used merely to express the pious sentiment of the
community.... Unless conduct "unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens harm to
individual or public interests," it is not deemed to be a proper subject of a penal
prohibition-a declaration designed to be given weight in the interpretation of the Code.
Herbert Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Law, in CRIME,
CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR LEON RADZINOWICZ 430
(Roger Hood ed., 1974); see also Robert Force, Decriminalization of Breach of the Peace
Statutes: A Non-Penal Approach to Order Maintenance, 46 TULANE L. REV. 367 (1972)
(arguing that public order should be maintained by means other than reflexive resort to the
criminal law). On the threat of trivialization and the concerns thereby raised more generally, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"? Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Richard A. Epstein,
Symposium, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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can be significant. Despite the "ancient faith" ' that localism represents a check
against mass despotism exercised by a distant sovereign, 2 history and experience
provide reason to be suspicious of local legislative authority. To be sure, localities
over the course of history have served as "islands" of tolerance, as suggested by
recently enacted civil laws protective of the gay, lesbian, and iransgender
communities, 2' as well as recurrent efforts by localities to de-criminalize
prostitutione l and the use or possession of small amounts of marijuana. 2
Localities, however, can also indulge in a marked tendency toward oppressive use
of the criminal sanction, as harsh laws targeting non-heterosexuals over the
course of history,233 and myriad other instances evidenced in the state 4 and
m Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547-48 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (noting the
"ancient faith... that experience in making local laws by local people themselves is by far the
safest guide for a nation like ours to follow"); see also People v. Hanrahan, 42 N.W. 1124, 1127
(Mich. 1889):
Common experience, and the necessities of our civilization, have shown that the grant to
and exercise by cities and villages of such power to enact ordinances, and to punish for
their violation, have been both wise and just, and have not operated oppressively upon the
citizen.... [l]f it should be attempted and results in wrong or oppression to the people, the
remedy is in their hands. The legislators are chosen by them, and it is in their power to
effect any needed reform.
m This faith in the benign role of local actors was colorfully noted by the Georgia
Supreme Court in 1877, describing municipal government as standing "between the family and
the state. It is an aid to both, and partakes of the nature of both. Police ordinances are at once
family rules on a large scale, and state laws on a small scale." McRea v. The Mayor and City
Council of Americus, 59 Ga. 168, 170 (1877).
2 See William N. Eskridge, Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 925-28, 970 (1997) (citing protective local laws).
31 For an interesting discussion of local suspension of state anti-prostitution laws in New
Orleans, St. Louis, and Houston, see Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1197, 1208-14 (1996). Professor Neuman characterizes such local initiatives as being "doubly
local": "they were subregions of a city, configured by city policy as a result of local self-
government within a state." Ia at 1213. Neuman compares the areas to churches in medieval
England where fleeing offenders were legally immune from arrest, "an immunity defined by
location." Id at 1206. Eventually, however, the refuges were stamped out because their
"subversive potential proved unacceptable to the larger society." Id. at 1226; see also JOEL
BEsT, CONTROLLING VICE: REGULATING BROTHEL PROSTITUTION IN ST. PAUL, 1865-1883
(1998) (examining St. Paul, Minnesota's "regulation" of prostitution, despite state law banningit).
232 See California County OKs Growing Pot, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Nov. 11, 2000,
at A10 (discussing laws enacted in Ann Arbor and Berkeley). But see City of Portland v.
Jackson, 87 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Or. 1993) (stating that localities are barred from "creating a 'safe
haven' for outlaws by legalizing, within boundaries of the city, that which the legislature has
made criminal statewide").
23 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American
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federalff reporters, attest. Recent municipal efforts to regulate the streets by
means of "loitering with intent" laws, which target "preparatory" conduct rather
than actual harmful conduct, provide additional evidence of their continued
aggressive ingenuity in this regard. 6 So do vehicle forfeiture laws, discussed
above. 7 This propensity for aggressive use of the criminal law, of course, is not
unique to local government-the states manifest such a propensity as well;23'
Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1038-45, app. 6 at
1134-36 (1997) (citing and discussing municipal laws criminalizing "cross-dressing" and other
crimes of "degeneracy"). This local intolerance also sought to suppress expressions of "gender-
bending" in theater, movies, and the arts more generally. See id. at 1075-80 (discussing same).
2 See, e.g., Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 349 P.2d 974 (Cal. 1960) (addressing local
"criminal registration" law, noting that ten California communities had similar laws); Thomas
v. State, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993) (discussing local law making it an arrestable offense to ride
a bicycle without a bell); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1989) (addressing
local anti-sodomy law that was far more restrictive than state law); State v. Ulesky, 252 A.2d
720 (N.J. 1969) (addressing local "criminal registration" law); People v. Buckley, 536 N.Y.S.2d
948 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1989) (discussing local law criminalizing use of beach chairs not provided
by concessionaire); People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963) (addressing local law that
criminalized having clotheslines in front yards); State v. Tyler, 7 P.3d 624 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(addressing local law making jaywalking punishable by imprisonment); Williams v. State, 726
S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (discussing a local law making illegal parking a
misdemeanor); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 548 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing local
law that "privatized" streets and sidewalks surrounding public housing project, permitting
prosecution under trespass laws); see also Mark Eddington, La Verkin Revises U.N. Law, SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE, July 26, 2001, at BI (discussing municipal ordinance in a remote Utah town
creating a "U[nited] N[ations]-free" zone).
23 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (addressing local law that criminalized animal sacrifice, engaged in by local religious
groups); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (addressing local law that
targeted "[r]ogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging... common
drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets .... "); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (addressing local law making it a crime for ex-convicts to fail
to register with police); Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (addressing local
law that criminalized being a prostitute, as opposed to engaging in prostitution); Farber v.
Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. III. 1975) (addressing local law that criminalized status of
being a prostitute, drug addict, habitual drunkard, or pimp); cf City of Clebume v. Clebume
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (addressing local law that required "special use permits" for
operation of group homes for mentally retarded persons).
236 See supra note 122 (citing examples).
237 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
23' See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (addressing state law that made it
a misdemeanor to "be addicted to the use of narcotics"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (addressing state law that permitted sterilization of "habitual felons"); Grosvenor v.
Duffy, 80 N.W. 19 (Mich. 1899) (addressing state law making the sale of oleomargarine a
crime); see also Cussing Canoeist Convicted in Michigan Court, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at
A4 (discussing state law that criminalized the use of indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or
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rather, local aggressiveness is significant for its augmentation of the already
expansive array of state and federal criminal laws at the disposal of
govemrnment.
239
It is difficult to account in any precise way for this punitive impulse. Perhaps
the tendency stems from local legislators' very proximity to disorder, which,
instead of mitigating punitiveness, might make them prone to react punitively,
240
and to indulge their own idiosyncratic standards of decorum.241 Public choice
insulting language in the presence or hearing range of children). For an interesting discussion of
the role of states in enacting religion-based "Sunday criminal laws" (i.e., "blue laws"), see
Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. REV. 675 (2000).
239 Beyond the numerous contemporary examples discussed throughout the article, history
provides an illuminating illustration of the corollary force of local criminal law making. In the
nineteenth century, southern state legislatures commonly enacted race-based laws making
blacks alone criminally liable for particular behaviors, or specifying harsher punishment for
blacks convicted of criminal laws also applicable to whites. See generally EDWARD L. AYERS,
VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH
(1984); DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1800-1863
(1987). Such laws, in tum, were mirrored in many localities. See, e.g., Commissioners of
Washington v. Frank, 46 N.C. 436 (N.C. 1854) (upholding local law for disorderly conduct,
which carried fines for white violators and "thirty-nine lashes" for blacks). In upholding the
local law, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Frank emphasized that:
Different regulations are required in different localities.... [T]he commissioners of every
incorporated town have a right to establish any and every regulation which, in their
judgment, is needful to the comfort and interests of the citizens.... Slaves compose so
large a portion of the population of our towns and villages that, in passing rules and
regulations for their government, much must be left to the judgment and discretion of those
who are to enforce them, in their application to particular cases.
Id. at 440-41.
Localities in the nineteenth century American West also made generous use of the
criminal law to differentially target persons of Chinese ancestry. See WILLIAM J. COURTNEY,
SAN FRANCISCO'S ANTI-CHINESE ORDINANCES, 1850-1990 passim (1956) (discussing laws
enacted by City including those making it a crime to "carry a basket or baskets, bag or bags,
suspended from or attached to poles upon the shoulder"; to discharge fireworks in Chinatown;
and to ring a gong during a theatrical perfornance); see also CHARLES MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF
EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1994) (discussing similar laws enacted by states); cf CORAMAE RICHEY MANN,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 132-33 (1993) (noting that in Portland, Oregon
between 1871-1885, sixty-eight percent of all gambling arrests involved Chinese suspects; in
1883, Chinese were twenty-nine times more likely to be arrested for gambling than non-
Chinese).
m Cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522-23 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting "social reality... [that] racial discrimination against any group finds a more
ready expression at the state and local level than at the federal level").
21 As Carl Bridenbaugh has noted, this impulse was especially evident in the governance
of America's earliest cities, where "village fathers" unabashedly sought to put their personal
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theory would suggest that local political leaders are as prone to "rent-seeking"
behavior in the anti-crime context as they are in local legislative decisions
pertaining to regulatory and economic matters.242 Indeed, the recognized political
appeal of appearing tough on crime and disorder2 43 might suggest an even greater
influence in the local political arena,244 the small scale of which might create a
particularly conducive environment for oppressive decisions.245
imprint on social control efforts:
In addition to legal restriction and penalties for their violation [of laws] similar to those that
govern the life of a citizen today, colonial townsfolk found themselves limited on all sides
by regulations of a moral and ethical character. Village fathers... regarded themselves as
rightfully their brothers' keepers, and exercised a continuous and strict supervision over
the daily lives of all inhabitants.
CARL BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS: THE FIRST CENTURY OF URBAN LIFE IN
AMERICA, 1625-1742,75 (1938). These efforts, Bridenbaugh notes, varied amongjurisdictions
in accord with the inclinations of local leaders. Id. at 76-78. The same impulse was evidenced
in waves of local laws conceming sanitation, health, and vice from the mid-nineteenth to early
twentieth centuries designed to combat social disorder by means of "moral environmentalism.'
STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, CONSTRUCTING URBAN CULTURE: AMERICAN CITIES AND CITY
PLANNING 111-49 (1989) (surveying such laws and the political forces giving rise to them).
212 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRnICALINTRODUCTION (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
See Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton's Crime Control Agenda, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 67, 67 (1997) (observing that "[s]ince crime cannot be significantly reduced
through legislation, politicians must rely on symbolic policies to convey the message that they
are doing something to solve the problem"). For extended discussion of this potent political
influence, see DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA (1995);
KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
(1997); Henry A. Chemoffet al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 (1996).
24Professor Gillette suggests that local governments are especially vulnerable to capture
and influence, in significant part because the smaller size of local governments facilitates
interest group influence:
[Local issues have characteristics that tend to exacerbate both formation of privileged
groups and free riding by latent groups. The possibility that interest groups are particularly
likely to form at the local level stems from that body of collective action theory that
suggests the possibility of collective action is directly related to the size of the affected
group.
Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify
Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 981 (1996).
25 Since at least the time of James Madison, it has been accepted learning that the dynamic
of small group relations raises the specter of political minorities exercising influence
disproportionate to their numbers. According to Madison:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
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Local punitiveness might also be explained in more pragmatic terms.
Urbanites historically have suffered a comparative paucity in available means of
social control, lacking much of the taxing and zoning prowess of affluent
suburbanites, for instance.246 The criminal sanction, for cities especially,247 has
always represented an easily adopted and expedient (if crude) method for the
control of "dangerous classes" thought to disproportionately inhabit cities,24' with
their distinct "criminal pathology."2 49 Evidence of this anxiety dates back to the
majority be found of the same party, and the smaller the number of individuals composing
a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plan of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength and to act in unison with each other.
THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, at 82-83, 114 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
24 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Building Community in the Twent-First Century: A Post-
Integrationist Vision for the American Metropolis, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1704, 1705 (2000) (noting
that "central cities and older suburbs, saddled with increasing populations of poor people and
attendant demands on their tax base, are incapable of using local powers in ways that wall out
'undesirables") (citation omitted).
Of course, this is not to say that cities over time have not also engaged in their share of
exclusionary zoning practices. One need only consider the ongoing efforts of the City of San
Francisco in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to use facially neutral zoning or
regulatory laws to target laundries operated by immigrant Chinese. See, e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, San Francisco law
limiting operation of laundries because it was enforced in a discriminatory manner); Yee Gee v.
City and County of San Francisco, 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1916) (invalidating, on equal
protection grounds, San Francisco law making it a misdemeanor for laundries to operate
between 6 P.M. and 7 A.M. and on Sundays).
247 Cities-with their heterogenous populations, diverse interests, and complex social
organization-represent classic realms in which social controls are potentially at their most lax,
increasing the practical need for explicit legal controls. See DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF
LAW 107 (1976) (noting that "[l]aw is stronger where other social control is weaker. Law varies
inversely with other social control').
24
" The phrase, but not the concept, traces to social reformer Charles Brace, who in 1872
characterized such persons as "hidden beneath the surface of society," a congregate of the
"great masses of the destitute, miserable, and criminal persons." CHARLES LORING BRACE, THE
DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK, AND TWENTY YEARS' WORK AMONG THEM 28-29
(1872); see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 83-106
(1993) (discussing historic use of criminal law to target particular "outsider" groups and
maintain societal status quo); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76-135 (1997)
(same, with particular focus on targeting of African-Americans).
249 See Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1999) (observing that "community policing" is "designed
especially to deal with the criminal pathology of inner city neighborhoods").
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late-seventeenth century 50 and has flared, often with unmistakable ethnic and
class-inspired vehemence, to this day. In 1889, the Supreme Court of Michigan
emphasized the unique utility of the criminal law to cities in particular, stating
that:
[I]t must happen that very many of the lesser crimes and misdemeanors which
are punished under general law must come under the police regulations of such
municipalities, because they are more liable to be perpetrated by the vicious
classes who congregate in cities than elsewhere; and the peace and good order of
the municipality requires that they should be more promptly and summarily dealt
with than they could under state law.2s'
While deployment of the criminal sanction by "elites" has met with criticism
for decades, z2 of late the discourse has assumed considerably greater nuance. Led
principally by Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, commentators have
defended the new wave of municipal criminal laws, offering several innovative
arguments. First, they assert that the local laws deserve greater deference than
past efforts to combat urban crime and disorder because the laws are the
democratic product of more racially representative political bodies.25' Second,
2'0See BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 241, at 68-78, 220-31, 382-84 (tracing historic shift
from 'rural neighborliness" and lack of concern over social disorder to nascent anxieties over
"growing disorder" in the late 1600s and early 1700s).
21 People v. Hanrahan, 42 N.W. 1124, 1126 (Mich. 1889). Twelve years earlier, the
Supreme Court of Georgia identified the unique criminal needs of urban areas as follows:
[M]any transactions that are made penal by the general law of the state may, at the same
time, afford material for a proper police ordinance. The state may deal only with the
central element of a transaction which is fringed all round with adjuncts that ought to be
prohibited by ordinance as highly mischievous to the quiet of municipal society. In the
country, such adjuncts might not need repression, for there they might be comparatively
harmless.
McRae v. The Mayor and City Council of Americus, 59 Ga. 168, 169 (1877). For an expansive
discussion of the "urban threat" and the perceived rampant immorality of nineteenth-century
urbanites more generally, see PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA,
1820-1920 (1978).
25On the relation between invocation of police powers and the historic ascendance and
development of capitalism, for instance, see DAVID MONTGOMERY, CrIZEN WORKER: THE
EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKEr
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTuRY 52-114 (1993); Eric H. Monkkonen, A Disorderly People?
Urban Order in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 68 J. AM. HIsT. 539 (1981).
See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 88
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1161-63 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis]; Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of
Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 210-11 [hereinafter Meares & Kahan,
Antiquated Procedural Thinking]; cf William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion,
1454 [Vol. 62:1409
CRIMINAL LAW OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE
they argue that today's urban residents, in contrast to those in the past, actually
welcome more aggressive criminal laws and enforcement, at the possible cost of
civil liberties, because they are disproportionately the victims of crime.2 4 Finally,
they note that the racial composition of urban police departments today better
reflects the citizens they serve, which lessens the need for suspicion that the laws
are being enforced in a discriminatory manner.25'
While this "new discretion scholarship" is primarily geared toward
neutralizing constitutional concern over discretionary enforcement, 2 6 it also
enjoys persuasive force with regard to the content of the laws themselves.217 Other
commentators, however, have vigorously contested the assertions that deference
to local democratic decisions, and the expectation that a given criminal law will
be fairly applied to the community at-large ("burden sharing"), should displace
constitutional inquiry.28 They also cast doubt on the belief that police forces are
70 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1960) (condemning anti-loitering laws because those arrested were
typically minorities lacking in political clout "to protect themselves" and the "prestige to
prevent an easy laying-on of hands by the police").
2m See KENNEDY, supra note 248, at 76-167; Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra
note 253 at 1163, 1166, 1182; Livingston, supra note 34, at 571; Meares & Kahan, Antiquated
Procedural Thinking, supra note 253 at 197; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights
Are Wrong, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 4.
This same sentiment was evidenced in the recent efforts by the Chicago Housing
Authority to conduct wholesale, warrantless searches of the apartments of persons residing in
the city's most crime-infested public housing projects. Advocates of "Operation Clean Sweep"
claimed the strategy was justified in part because a portion of the residents in the projects
welcomed the searches. See Corey Roush, Note, Warrantless Public Housing Searches:
Individual Violations or Community Solutions, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 261 (1996).
255 See Kahan & Meares, The Coming Crisis, supra note 253, at 1162.
-6 See David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L. 1059, 1063-70 (1999) (noting same and discussing
the various arguments in support).
2' As suggested throughout, the existence of police discretion to enforce, or not enforce,
local law is intimately tied to the breadth of local legislative authority. the greater the number of
criminal laws, the greater the degree of available police discretion. As noted by Professor
Alfred Hill, "[t]he issue of police discretion is of special importance now because of the advent
of community policing, with its focus on quality-of-life offenses, and its over-arching purpose
of forestalling major criminality by discouraging petty affronts to public order." Hill, supra note
249, at 1307.
25' Professor Toni Massaro has characterized the analysis as one asking solely "Who voted
for this law," rather than "Who voted for this law and what does this law do?" TONI MASSARO,
THE GANG'S NOT HERE, 2 GREEN BAG 25, 29 (1998); see also Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen
I Sehulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares
and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 240 ("Our Constitution does not permit a majority to
limit individual rights simply by offering to share the burden."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Forward:
Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 775, 827 (1999) ("[P]olitical process theory does not support relaxing
14552001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
sufficiently integrated to warrant the mooting of discriminatory enforcement
concerns, 259 and question whether the new laws, the Chicago anti-gang loitering
ordinance at issue in Morales in particular, actually enjoyed broad-based political
support,26 presuming that a popular vote by elected officials can ever give voice
to the entire "community. 261 There will always be those whose sentiments are
out-voted or not heard in the first instance: "the losers will generally be those
without effective political power," as Professor David Cole has observed.262
Consistent with this analysis, empirical work suggests that, among urban
constitutional scrutiny of the gang-loitering ordinance or other order-maintenance policing
strategies."); id. at 834 ('The Constitution places limits on the government's ability to conduct
social experiments that sacrifice minority freedoms to enhance the welfare of the majority.").
259 Citing Department of Justice data, Professor Cole notes that African-Americans
comprise somewhere in the range of half the rank and file of police departments in major urban
areas and adds that "the problem of discretion and discrimination does not disappear when
black officials exercise police power." Cole, supra note 256, at 1081; see also C.J. Chivers, For
Black Officers, Diversity Has Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2001, at Al (noting paucity of
blacks in supervisory positions in the New York City Police Department and that a mere 9.2%
of the force is African-American).
2w See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 258, at 216-20; Cole, supra note 256, at 1066-
67, 1080; Alan M. Dershowitz, Rights and Interests, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 10;
Roberts, supra note 258, at 822-25, 827-28.
26 See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 258, at 241:
Which community counts-the minority community or the residents of the highest crime
wards? And what procedures should be used to sort through the conflicting preferences
held by members of the either one of these groups? ... Should one speak of the "minority
community" without dividing it, or should one speak of Chicago's Latino community or,
more narrowly, of the Mexican-American community?
See also Mary I. Coombs, The Constricted Meaning of "Community" in Community Policing,
72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1367, 1373 (1998) (' Te 'community' whose interests are to be
considered in a community policing model is often ill-defined or defined in a way
disproportionately likely to exclude those whose interests are in less aggressive policing. What
are the boundaries of the community?"); Roberts, supra note 258, at 823 ("Any claim of Black
community consensus begs the questions, what defines the community?, who represents the
community?, and how are residents' voices counted?"); cf Regina Austin, "The Black
Community, "Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1817
(1992) (rejecting the notion that a "black community" per se exists, but rather a population of
varied economic, social, and cultural interests).
= Cole, supra note 256, at 1082. Professor Cole adds that:
In the best of all possible worlds, inner-city residents might well prefer increased
investments in job training, public schools, economic development, and afterschool
programs to an expansion of police discretion and aggressive quality-of-life policing. But
if the larger community is unwilling to provide the former investments, and is only willing
to provide increased resources if they take the form of policing, residents will have a less
than free hand in striking the appropriate balance.
Id. at 1088.
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African-Americans at least, there exists considerable distaste for aggressive resort
by police to the criminal law for non-serious forms of social disorder. According
to one recent study, for instance, there is a strong negative attitudinal correlation
between arrest rates for low-level offenses and a positive one between arrest rates
for violent crimes, i.e., such citizens disfavor widespread police resort to arrest for
low-level offenses, yet favor arrest for serious crimes.263 This finding is in
keeping with persistent survey results suggesting that large numbers of African-
Americans believe that police treat them unfairly,264 a perception exacerbated by
the acknowledged disproportionate use by police of stops without arrest in
minority communities.265 One clear implication of such findings is that we should
be suspicious of the "ancient faith" that municipal governance is immune to
despotic tendencies; 26 indeed, the very propinquity of local legislators to social
m See Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and
Perceptions ofFairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1225-26 (2000).
2 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS I11 tbl.232 (Kathleen Maquire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999)
(stating that over forty percent of African-Americans surveyed felt that police single them out
for differential treatment); STEvEN SMrrH, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CrrIES 25 (1998) (stating that
Afican-Americans in twelve cities surveyed are more than twice as likely to be dissatisfied
with police treatment than whites); Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds
Many Think Police Are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al (reporting that ninety percent
of Aflican-Americans surveyed in New York City believe the police single them out for
aggressive, differential enforcement).
For an overview of the persistent, strong statistical relationship between race and negative
sentiments toward police behaviors more generally, see Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing:
Residents' Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 129 (2000); see also
Tracey Maclin, Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243, 264 (1991) (stating that
"[f]or many blacks, police officers are the most immediate representatives of the justice system.
When police harass black men, the history of discrimination ... suddenly becomes very alive
and current. [Police abuses] have no doubt contributed to the mistrust that many blacks feel
toward law enforcement).
20 See STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 189; Leslie Casimir et. al., Minority Men: We
Are Frisk Targets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, March 26, 1999, at 34 (discussing results from an
informal survey of one hundred African-American and Hispanic males in New York City,
eighty-one reported being stopped by police at least once, yet none of the stops resulted in an
arrest).
In New York's minority communities for instance, police stops have become a "fact of
life," prompting African-American and Latino parents to instruct their children on how to
behave when detained by police, and to encourage them to carry identification at all times.
Felicia R. Lee, Young and in Fear of Police; Parents Teach Children How to Deal With
Officers'Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at B1.
266 For a provocative discussion of how ostensibly neutral local laws, such as those
conceming auto cruising, street vending or youth curfews, have "racialized" effects, see Regina
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disorder, .iowever defined, and felt need to "do something" about it, might make
their governance in the crime area less, rather than more advisable.267
Finally, if perceived as arbitrary or unfair, local laws can have broader,
socially destabilizing effects. Most fundamentally, they can foster a sense of
illegitimacy, which serves to undermine necessary confidence in and respect for
the criminal law. As social psychologist Tom Tyler has observed, "the key to the
effectiveness of legal authorities lies in creating and maintaining the public view
that authorities are functioning fairly.' 268 Local laws that are perceived as unfair
can breed disrespect for law and government, providing a perverse incentive for
lawbreaking,269 and engender resistance to formal legal authority.270 Moreover,
Austin, "Not Just for the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, Social
Inequality, and the Privatization ofPublic Space, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 667 (1998).
27Cf David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the Devils Advocate, in
COMMuNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 231-32 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D.
Mastrofski eds., 1988) (observing with respect to community policing that"local accountability
does not substitute for professional, independent oversight. Quite the contrary, it makes it more
necessary. Americans especially have been naive about this, believing that rectitude was
assured by local control. Responsiveness may be achieved in this way, but not propriety under
Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and
Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 989 (2000) [hereinafter Willingness]; see also
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 361 (2001) [hereinafter Law Abidingness]; Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?:
Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
103 (1998).
269TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 6 (1990) [hereinafter WHY PEOPLE
OBEY] (observing a "two-stage process... with people's judgments about the justice or
injustice of their experience affecting their views about the legitimacy of the authorities, and
these views in turn shaping compliance with the law"); id. at 108 (noting that "[i]f people feel
unfairly treated when they deal with legal authorities, they then view the authorities as less
legitimate and as a consequence disobey the law frequently in their everyday lives."); see also
TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 176 (1997) (noting that "people
who experience procedural justice when they deal with authorities are more likley to view those
authorities as legitimate, to accept their decisions, and to obey social rules"); Tom R. Tyler &
John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the
Legitimacy ofLegal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 707, 719 (2000) (stating that "[t]o sustain its moral authority, the law must be
experienced as consistent with people's sense of morality.... Typically, people are less willing
to follow legal rules when those legal rules are not supported by their moral values"); cf
Raymond Patemoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on
Spouse Assault, 31 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 163, 176-82 (1997) (discussing correlation between
police behaviors and citizen perceptions of police legitimacy); Anne Bowen Poulin,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection after United States v.
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1087 (1997) (observing that "cynicism fostered by the
appearance of unfaimess may encourage disregard for and disobedience of the law"); Lawrence
W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J.
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perceptions of illegitimacy, Tyler's work shows, can foster alienation and social
estrangement on a more personal level. This is because individuals "use their
treatment by authorities as information about their status in society" since "fair
and respectffl treatment acknowledges people's importance and status, while
unfair and disrespectful treatment communicates marginality."27' This alienating
influence, social disorganization theory would suggest, further heightens
prospects for law breaking.27
The likelihood of such disrespect is high enough with respect to the
enforcement of state criminal laws, which, whether justified or not, can benefit
from appearing the result of superior democratic consensus. Municipal criminal
laws, with their interstitial quality and frequent focus on malum prohibitum
behaviors, are logically at special risk for being viewed as illegitimate, 273 thus
RES. CRIME & DELNQ. 445, 463 (1993) (noting that in a Milwaukee domestic violence study,
abusers who felt they were unfairly treated by police were thirty-six percent more likely to
abuse within six months);
For an insightful discussion of the ways in which the Fourth Amendment is itself based on
"reciprocal trust" between citizens and their government, see generally Scott E. Sundby,
"Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and
Citizen?, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1751 (1994).
270 On the basis of recent surveys conducted in Oakland and Los Angeles, Tyler
discovered a very strong positive association between citizens' perceptions of whether legal
authorities are acting in good faith and their willingness to comply with the law. His conclusion:
the effectiveness of legal authorities such as police "lies in their ability to gain acceptance for
their decisions among the members of the public with whom they personally deal." Law
Abidingness, supra note 268, at 363. To Tyler,
[the] findings suggest that tust is important not only because it shapes acceptance within
the immediate situation, but also because dealing with an authority that is viewed as
trustworthy also shapes people's general orientation toward the law and legal authorities.
These findings suggest a further importance of personal experiences. They are one type of
information that people use to make general judgments about authorities.
Id at 389. Tyler thus infers that voluntary compliance can be better fostered by developing trust
in the "benevolence of [legal authorities'] motives," which "encourag[es] cooperation" as a
"proactive model of social regulation," compared to commonly embraced coercive and
deterrence-based approaches. Id. at 406.
Tyler's survey of "motive based trust" involved over 1,500 subjects, with whites, African-
Americans, and Hispanics about equally represented in the sample. Id. at 373. The primary
basis for interaction with police among those surveyed involved a request for police help (54%),
followed by being detained by police (32%). Id.
271 Willingness, supra note 268, at 1001.
2
n See Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing
Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. Soc. 774 (1989).
273 As Professor Tyler has written, individuals view the law as "legitimate," as having
"moral credibility," when they see the law as reifying broadly held moral beliefs. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 269, at 32-37, 64-68, 161-63.
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reducing likely voluntary compliance with the law.274 As Paul Robinson recently
observed, "the criminal law's influence... as a moral authority has effect
primarily at the borderline of criminal activity," as opposed to more serious
criminal law prohibitions (e.g., murder, rape, or robbery) which enjoy proscriptive
benefit from "common sense."275 However, it is at the "borderline ... where there
may be some ambiguity as to whether the conduct is really wrong."276 If this is so,
municipal criminal laws, which most often operate at this very "borderline,"
should wan-ant particular concem.2
C. Balkanization of the Criminal Law
A final concern stems from the diversity of municipal criminal laws
themselves, a concrete outgrowth of the revered responsiveness of municipal
governance.278 This very dynamic quality, however, can threaten a balkanization
of the criminal law, which the judicial tools of preemption and conflict doctrine
have done little to protect against. Together, preemption and conflict seek to head
off "uncertainty and confusion" that would otherwise result from inconsistent
laws within a given state.279 As discussed, however, true to the deference afforded
home rule, courts typically go out of their way to avoid finding preemption and
conflict.280 As a result, localities use their broad authority to criminalize behaviors
274Id, at 31 (noting that persons "who view authority as legitimate are more likely to
comply with legal authority, whether the legitimacy is expressed as obligation or as support");
see also HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORrrY AND RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1989) (stating that "[o]nce a
demand is categorized as legitimate, the person to whom it is addressed enters a situation where
his personal preferences become more or less irrelevant").
275 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1865 n.84 (2000); see
also id. at 1869 ("A criminal law that eams a reputation for moral credibility can influence the
shaping of norms and, through them, conduct But to become a moral authority, the criminal
law cannot deviate too far from what the community thinks is just, that is, too far from lay
intuitions of'justice.").
276 Id.; see also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JuSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMuNITY VIEws AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
277 Cf OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (Little, Brown & Co., 1948)
(1881) ("[A] law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear.").
278 See supra notes 4, 83-84 and accompanying text (noting that one of the prime
attractions of local governance is that it permits greater familiarity and responsiveness to local
need& See Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1300 (Kan. 1975) (Schroeder, J., dissenting)
(observing that the doctrines are rules "of necessity, based upon the need to prevent dual
regulations which could result in uncertainty and confusion").
2 See supra notes 81-143 and accompanying text.
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not expressly addressed by state criminal law, supplement extant state law by
criminalizing closely related (but distinct) behaviors, and impose varied
procedural regimes and sanctions. 281
This diversity has at least two significant potential consequences. The first
relates to notice. While it remains axiomatic that ignorance of the law is no
defense to criminal liability,282 due process compels that behaviors potentially
subject to penal prohibitions be reasonably knowable in advance.283 The
proliferation of local criminal laws, however, imposes a correspondingly lessened
likelihood that the substantive reach and content of such laws can be known, and
therefore observed. This is especially of concern to itinerant citizens passing
through a given locality, a common occurrence in today's highly mobile society.
Just such a concern was addressed by the Supreme Court in Lambert v.
California,284 where the Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance making it a
crime for one previously convicted of a felony to fail to register with local
authorities285 because the law did not require proof of "actual knowledge of the
duty to register or the proof of the probability of such knowledge. 286 Lambert,
however, today endures as little more than as a pedagogic chestnut found in
criminal law casebooks, supporting Justice Frankfirter's prediction in dissent that
the holding would amount to "an isolated deviation.., a derelict on the waters of
the law."287 The Court has never revisited the principle enunciated in Lambert,
while local governments have proceeded to enact a myriad of criminal laws,
rendering residents and non-residents alike susceptible to prosecution without
281 See supra notes 144-169 and accompanying text.
m See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (noting that "[t]he general rule
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to a criminal prosecution is deeply
rooted in the American legal system"). The pragmatic basis for this view was eloquently
captured by Justice Holmes:
It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known
that he was breaking the law, but to admit [ignorance or mistake] as an excuse at all would
be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and
obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other
side of the scales.
HOLMES, supra note 276, at 48. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law is an
Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997) (discussing moral
undernnings of "mistake of law" doctrine).
See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939).
2L 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
2Id. at 229-30.
m Id. at 228-29.
27 Id. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE LJ. 1, 69 (1997)
(noting that "Lambert's notice principle tums out not to matter").
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leave for ignorance.2 88
This state of affairs should be a source of concern, given what we know about
citizens' scant familiarity with criminal legal expectations. For years empirical
work has made clear the existence of significant knowledge deficits among
citizens with respect to the "general" criminal law and changes made to it.
2 9
Greater concern should logically arise, therefore, when municipalities
unexpectedly criminalize behaviors, especially those of a malum prohibitum
nature.290 This knowledge deficit, moreover, assumes major practical importance
given the expansive authority possessed by modem police to execute warrantless
arrests for "very minor offenses," endorsed by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.29' Thus, the legislative decision by
m See MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 27.57, at 448 (stating that "[a]l] persons upon whom
valid ordinances are binding are charged with constructive notice of those ordinances, and a
defendant cannot show that he or she did not know of the existence of the ordinance. So, for
like reason, it is no defense that one is a nonresident, where an ordinance is intended to apply to
all within the corporate limits").
2'9 See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS,'PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35-52 (1997) (discussing research findings from studies highlighting low
levels of public familiarity with criminal laws and punishments). As Professor William Stuntz
recently observed, "[o]rdinary people do not have the time or training to learn the contents of
criminal codes.... Criminal codes therefore do not and cannot speak to ordinary citizens
directly." William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2000).
m On the historic distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum crimes more
generally, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2d ed. 1986).
121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001). In so deciding, by a 5-4 vote, the Court placed its
imprimatur on the ongoing, decades-long legislative empowerment of police to execute
warrantless arrests for non-breach of the peace offenses, in contrast to traditional common law
limits. As Professor Barbara Salken had noted:
Prior to the mid 1800s... the summons was the rule.... Legislatures then adopted statutes
granting sweeping arrest powers. Without considering whether the taking of immediate
custody was necessary, legislatures began to authorize custodial arrests for minor crimes.
This change appears to have been aimed at making it easier to arrest without a warrant, but
the effect was to authorize custodial arrests for many offenses, "such as ordinances and
regulatory violations, that had previously not been subject to arrest at all."
Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221,258-59
(1989) (citations omitted); see also Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to
Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 363 (1936) (noting that "[recent
statutes] have brought within the area of legal arrest a vast number of misdemeanors which
were not breaches of the peace at common law, and hence not subject to arrest without warrant
even though committed in the presence of an officer"); Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541,550 (1924) (observing that "states may, by statute, enlarge the
common law right to arrest without a warrant, and have quite generally done so or authorized
municipalities to do so, as for example, an officer may be authorized by statute or ordinance to
arrest without a warrant for various misdemeanors and violations of ordinances, other than
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some (but not, perhaps problematically, all) municipalities to criminalize and
enforce low-level disorder offenses raises a troubling specter: arrests (and hence
searches) of citizens are free to occur merely on the basis of intra-state
geography.29 2 Addressing this concern in 1927, Harvard Law Professors Francis
Bohlen and Harry Shulman characterized the availability of arrest for violations
of municipal law as being "doubly" problematic and "appaling," given the
variability of the laws in what to them was an increasingly mobile society:
People no longer live their whole lives in the village in which they were born.
They pass freely from place to place, and in transit go through innumerable
towns and villages. The risk of being arrested on sight, because one's conduct
contravenes some regulation, which the wisdom of the local Solons deems
necessary, is appalling to any thinling person. It would be impossible to know at
what moment one might become amenable to arrest. Even that outworn and
discredited fiction that every man knows the law has never been pushed to such
an extreme as to justify imposing such consequences upon an ignorance of the
local ordinances of the myriads of small communities through which modem
men constantly pass.293
Notice concerns, however, can also arise with respect to more serious
offenses, the criminality of which citizens are presumably aware, when localities
breaches of the peace, if committed in his presence"). For commentary critical of police resort
to arrest for minor crimes, see, for example, Thomas R. Folk, The Case for Constitutional
Constraints upon the Power to Make Full Custody Arrests, 48 CINN. L. REV. 321 (1979);
William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo.
L. REV. 771 (1993). By the Supreme Court's count, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
today afford police some degree of authority to execute warrantless arrests for non-breach of the
peace misdemeanors and violations. See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1552 & app.
292 Texas statutory law contains a notably curious instance of this disuniformity. Since
1856, Texas law has expressly afforded "towns and cities" the right to enact laws "authorizing
the arrest, without warrant, of persons found in suspicious places," on the belief that a crime has
been or might be committed. See Gerald S. Reamey, Arrests in Texas's "Suspicious Places " A
Rule in Search of Reason, 31 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 931 (2000) (discussing TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vemon 2000) and predecessor versions). Professor Reamey
expresses understandable concern over "why such rule making would be delegated to the
lowest level of govemment. It is especially important that this kind of arrest procedure rule be
consistent throughout the state, and there is no special virtue in consulting varying community
standards in the legislative consideration of such rules." Id at 945.
293 Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman, Arrest With and Without a Warrant, 75 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 491-92 (1927). The authors also noted with great prescience that "[t]he privilege to
arrest without a warrant will undoubtedly lead to officers taking into custody persons for
offenses which, though actually committed in the presence of the officer, are subsequently
deemed too insignificant to warrant prosecution." Id at 490. Today's widespread resort to arrest
without prosecution would appear to amply substantiate the authors' fears. See supra note 202.
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experiment with sanctions. For example, in City of Niles v. Howard,294 a locality
elevated the state's punishment for simple marijuana possession (under state law
a minor misdemeanor involving a maximum $100 fine with no jail time, and
which did not form the basis for a "criminal record"), to a "first degree"
misdemeanor, subjecting the defendant to a six month jail term and a $500 fine. A
majority of the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the provision,29s prompting a
dissenting justice to retort that "[t]he citizens of the state will be wise if they begin
to research the laws of each city that they intend to pass through prior to traveling
along our highways. 296 The judge continued:
The case before us today is not a "marijuana case." The issues presented
directly involve the constitutional balance between the authority of the General
Assembly and the authority of the municipal government....
Municipalities are now granted authority to convert any minor misdemeanor into
a misdemeanor in the first degree; and, as a result, uniformity in the application
of the criminal laws and penalties in Ohio will be diminished. Individuals
traveling on our highways under the belief that their conduct is not punishable by
imprisonment will suddenly find themselves inside the boundaries of a
municipality . . where their conduct is punishable by six months in jail. Having
no notice of the "recriminalization" of their activities upon entering the city
limits, certain of these individuals undoubtedly will be arrested and convicted
under these municipal ordinances. These individuals will face imprisonment, be
burdened with a criminal record, and potentially suffer from a loss of
employment or even a destroyed career, while their counterparts outside the city
limits merely will receive a citation and no more than a $100 fine.297
Local forfeiture laws provide another reason for concern. 298 Aside from the
obvious worry that such laws provide local law enforcement with undue
monetary incentives to be overzealous, also evident with state and federal
forfeiture laws,299 the geographically varied use of such laws within a given state
raises basic fairness concerns. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, writing in 1992,
invalidated an aggressive automobile forfeiture provision enacted by the City of
St. Paul, and voiced just such a worry:
294 466 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio 1984).
295 Id. at 541.
2 Id. at 544 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 543 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
m See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussing same).
299 See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 76-83 (1998) (discussing negative influences of
forfeiture laws on law enforcement practices).
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[F]orfeitures of motor vehicles, for misdemeanor offenses varying from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, [would] impose[ ] uncertainty and
confusion... []he number of misdemeanor offenses, which could involve a
motor vehicle, is too great to allow a proliferation of local forfeiture ordinances.
Under a municipal forfeiture system, motor vehicle owners could risk their
vehicles for a different offense in each municipality.... [T]he adverse effect of a
local ordinance upon transient citizens outweighs the benefit to the City of St.
Paul.3
0
Notwithstanding this concem, as discussed above, forfeiture is enjoying
increased use among localities. 30' For instance, in upholding the City of
Oakland's aggressive forfeiture law, the California Court of Appeals recently
emphasized that "the adverse effect of the ordinance on transient citizens of the
state" does not "outweigh the benefit to the municipality"; the law "is directed at
the protection of public safety, and targets ... transient and resident alike."302 The
court added that "[w]hen state legislation does not address the demands of
particular urban areas, 'it becomes proper and even necessary for municipalities
to add to state regulations provisions adapted to their special requirements."' 33
Finally, intra-state variability raises possible concern that citizens will be
denied equal protection of the laws. When a locality criminalizes behavior not
targeted by the state and even other local governments, makes prosecution easier
as a result of reducing the required mens rea, or sanctions more harshly,3°4 such
lack of uniformity threatens unequal treatment.305 So too does the use of
differential procedural regimes, which, as discussed above, can have
constitutional overtones.3
However, no equal protection claim would likely be available. This is
because residence in a political subdivision of a state in itself does not constitute a
"suspect" or even "quasi-suspect" classification for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes, consequently triggering ordinary rational basis scrutiny for any such
claim. 30 7 As the Supreme Court observed almost forty years ago in upholding a
3 State v. Gonzales, 483 N.W.2d 736,738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).30 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
302 Horton v. City of Oaldand, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371,375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
I0 d. (citation omitted).
304 See supra notes 87-165 and accompanying text.
305 As then Justice Rehnquist noted over twenty years ago, "[t]he imaginary line defining a
city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. A city's decisions
inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders." Holt Civic Club v. City
of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60,69 (1978).
306 See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
307In denying an equal protection challenge against a local disorderly conduct law that
imposed a greater penalty than that of an identical state law, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated:
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Virginia county's decision to shut down its schools in order to avoid racial
desegregation: "[There is no rule that [localities]... must be treated alike; the
Equal Protection Clause relates to equal protection of the laws 'between persons
as such rather than between areas.' 30 8 This orientation was evidenced some
eighty years earlier when the Court, addressing an equal protection claim based
on Missouri's power to impose a different method of judicial appeal in the City of
St. Louis, remarked that the Equal Protection Clause ensured that "no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like
circumstances." 3°9 Given that laws can vary among the states, the Court discerned
"no solid reason" why intrastate variation should not also be condoned by the
Constitution.
310
Nor, it seems, would an equal protection claim lie on the theory that a
fundamental right is differentially impinged by local law. Conceivably, the right
to travel could serve as a basis for such a claim. 311 The right has at times been
extended by lower courts to the right to intrastate, not just interstate, travel.3 12 The
Supreme Court, however, has also been at pains to emphasize that travel is
unconstitutionally impinged only when it denies a "necessity of life, '313 and while
particular local laws might affect such rights, e.g., targeting the homeless with
laws criminalizing sleeping or eating in public,314 in principle local criminal laws
Because situations are different from city to city, the Constitution and the legislature have
given municipalities some leeway in exacting the penalties they deem appropriate.
Because it is conceivable that the state and municipalities can have different and equally
legitimate policy objectives, there is a rational basis for allowing a city to set different
penalties from those contained in identical state law.
City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445, 451 (La. 1995); see also MCQU1LLIN,
supra note 24, § 23.01, at 501 (observing that "the fact that an ordinance has provisions for
people within a municipal corporation that are different from statutory provisions outside the
municipal corporation does not in itself result in unconstitutional discrimination, where the
classification is based upon a reasonable distinction').308 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 230 (1964) (quoting Salsburg v. Maryland,
346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954)).309 Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22,31 (1880).31°Id
"
311 See Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 n.2 (1986) (asserting
that the right to travel receives "its most forceful expression in the context of an equal protection
analysis"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (noting that travel is a fundamental
right that has been "firmly established and repeatedly recognized").312 See, e.g., Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990); King v. New Rochelle
Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y.19 74 ).
3" See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,259 (1974).
314 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810F. Supp. 1551, 1580-83 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
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do not, thus undercutting a rights-based claim. 315 Equally unavailing, it would
appear, would be a discrimination-based claim sounding in the "Privileges and
Immunities" Clause of article IV or the "Privileges or Immunities" Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as each protects against discriminatory treatment on the
basis of state (not local) residence and citizenship. 316
In ultimate terms, while local laws might not raise constitutional concern as a
technical matter, this does not speak to the troubling practical consequences317 and
policy concerns31 8 potentially raised by intra-state criminal law variations.
Although the state-federal relationship obviously differs in important ways from
the state-local relationship,319 the concerns raised over the increasing
(granting injunction against Miami's use of criminal laws to arrest homeless persons for such
"inoffensive conduct').315 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and
Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261,295-308 (1987) (discussing the failure of courts to
police municipal variations in treatment of fundamental rights).316 See generally Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1241 (1998); Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz,
Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 553 (2000).
317 See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 315, at 306-07 (noting that "[i]ndividuals can choose
membership in another subdivision only by change of residence, a[n] action with extraordinary
costs, and one whose practical availability to different individuals varies with their
circumstances"). Another commentator has adopted a decidedly more dogmatic view with
regard to local laws that are perceived as unfair:
Because withdrawal from the local community is easier than from the state or national
community, it is less distasteful for a local govemment to subject its members to
community decisions. People who disagree with the choices of a particular community can
seek a community more compatible with their values or they can choose to live in no
community at all.
Kevin J. Worthen, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative Power ofAmerican
Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1273, 1285 (1991).
"' See City of Niles v. Howard, 466 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ohio 1984) (Sweeney, J.,
dissenting) (stating that state-local disuniformity'technically may not 'qualify as a deprivation
of either due process or equal protection, but it clearly is highly inequitable"); Commonwealth
v. Cabell, 185 A.2d 611, 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (stating that lack of geographical
"uniformity in criminal legislation" and the "difficulties which would arise from the fact that the
state and a city might both make the same act criminal and subject to different or cumulative
penalties ... raise no question of constitutionality, whatever may be said of them as a matter of
policF,).
Municipalities, of course, are thought to owe their very existence to their coordinate
state governments, in contrast to the states, which enjoy an organic sovereignty and
independence from the federal government. See supra notes 10, 61-62 and accompanying text.
It bears mention, however, that, as an historical matter, localities actually very often preceded
creation of the state governments that would come to have dominion over them. See generally
Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 394-431 (1985).
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"federalization" of crime in many respects track those raised by increasing
localization. The Court's decision in United States v. Lopez32 ° notwithstanding,
the reality is that the federal government continues to commandeer criminal law
territory from the states,321 the traditional purveyors and keepers of the general
criminal law.3  The result has been a substantive overlap 3z comparable to that
created in state-local relations explored at length here.324 As a result of this
overlap, fairness concerns have arisen in the state-federal arena, especially with
regard to drug3 s and weapons-related offenses,326 where state penalties remain
"514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (citiation omitted) (invalidating federal "Gun-Free
Schools Zone Act" on Commerce Clause grounds, observing that "when Congress criminalizes
conduct already denounced as criminal by the states, it effects 'a change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction").
321 For a discussion of the limited effects of Lopez and the continued aggressive extension
of federal criminal law authority, see Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893,
921-24 (2000).
According to one recent study, "[m]ore than 40% of the Federal criminal provisions
enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970." TASK FORCE ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRiMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION 7 (1998). The Task Force observes that the one-time estimate of 3,000 federal crimes
on the books "is now surely outdated.' Id. at 9 n.11. Indeed, taking account of the
superabundance of "regulatory' crimes, it appears that the number of federal crimes exceeds
300,000. See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion, and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting
"'Apparent Innocence " in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1995).32See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (observing that "preventing and
dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal
Government").
323 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization ofAmerican Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.L 1135, 1162 (1995) (noting that "[m]any federal criminal statutes overlap
with or merely duplicate state law prohibitions unrelated to any substantial federal interesf);
Peter J. Henning, Foreword: Statutory Interpretation and the Federalization of Criminal Law,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1167 (1996) (noting that federal criminal laws "in large
measure duplicate crimes that the states can prosecute").32 Indeed, in this sense the "new federalism" embraced by the Lopez Court lies with the
grain of increasing localization; both see diversity as a virtue. See Frank S. Alexander, Inherent
Tensions Between Home Rule and Regional Planning, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 541-42
(2000) (recognizing same).
32S See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (denying motion for
discovery relating to selective prosecution challenge, based, inter alia, on allegedly
discriminatory choice to prosecute African-American crack cocaine defendants in federal, not
state, court); United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying due process
challenge when defendant received four times as great a prison sentence pursuant to federal
drug law, compared to that authorized by state drug law).
326 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 236 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying selective
prosecution claim against "Operation Triggerlock," under which federal prosecutors screen
local police arrests for potential federal violations); see also United States v. Nathan, 202 F3d
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modest compared to the draconian terms mandated by federal law.327 Different
procedural and evidentiary rules, and constitutional safeguards, likewise, can
make federal prosecution more appealing (i.e., easier) than state prosecutions.3 21
Plainly, analogous differences exist in the state-local realm, raising the prospect
that a citizen will be treated quite differently merely on the basis of where within
the state a particular offense is alleged to have occurred. Ultimately, if left to
fester, such variability might inspire internecine antagonisms among
municipalities themselves, when citizens are treated differently from one
230 (4th Cir. 2000) (denying Tenth Amendment challenge against "Project Exile," ajoint state-
federal effort that prosecutes firearm-related offenses in federal court pursuant to more punitive
federal law, despite the fact that suspects are arrested by local police).327 See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S.
CAL. L. REv. 643, 668-69 (1997) (asserting that "disparity between state and federal state
prosecution is a hallmark of federalization" and that "defendants typically fare considerably
worse when prosecuted in federal court'); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest
in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 1134 (1997) (stating that "[t]he routine
enforcement of so many duplicative federal crimes harms state autonomy because federal
prosecutions establish an alternate authority"). See generally Jamie Gorelick & Harry Litman,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (1995)
(discussing the critical importance of forum decisions in prosecutorial decisions).
These forum-shopping considerations, in turn, have been encouraged by the courts,
whether intentionally or not. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979)
(holding that federal prosecutors, presented with two federal statutes covering same conduct,
are empowered to select criminal statute with harsher penalty); United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d
603 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant can be prosecuted pursuant to federal law, with
harsher punishment, despite existence of state law carrying lesser penalty for identical conduct).
38 On this point more generally, see Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the
Federalization of Criminal Law. The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997); John C. Jeffiies & John Gleeson, The
Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1095 (1995); Greg Hollon, Note, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 499 (1996).
This increase in federal criminal jurisdiction has prompted a novel rethinking, if not
reconfiguration, of the traditional party lines in debates about state-federal relations. As
Professor Rory Little has noted:
For example, many "liberals" today oppose the federalization of crime largely because of
the severity of federal criminal Sentencing Guidelines enacted in 1986. Yet these
opponents may be loath to make states-rights federalism arguments ... that were
successfully battled decades ago. At the same time, the customary advocates of a federalist
states-rights theory tend today to be conservative law-and-order proponents of federalizing
criminal statues. They have little interest in raising federalism concerns... at least in the
political realms where the federalization debate is being played out.
Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1065-66
(1995).
2001] 1469
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
jurisdiction to another, 29 to the nation's detriment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, "our localism" shows no sign of abating,30 as laws
enacted by municipalities, in ever greater numbers,331 enjoy enormous deference
from the courts and policy makers.332 The laws, in their myriad form and content
give expression to what Professors Michael Doff and Charles Sabel have recently
referred to as "an emergent experimentalist government,3 33 which above all
"gives locales substantial latitude in defining problems for themselves. ' 334 This
article has focused on one outgrowth of this phenomenon in particular, addressing
developments in the domain of the criminal law, a critically important realm of
local legislative authority heretofore largely taken for granted by courts and
commentators.
This article has explored the ways in which municipalities are now asserting
themselves in creating-not just enforcing--criminal laws, and identified several
central concerns. The discussion has sought to draw attention to these concerns,
329 Intra-state tension is already manifest in instances of concurrent jurisdiction, with
prosecutors from coordinate governments "racing to the courthouse," motivated at least in part
by the financial benefits associated with securing convictions. See, e.g., Bush v. Williams, 504
So. 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1987). Tensions are also evident in the realm of state-federal-
local relations, as local police are now turning seized assets over to federal and not state
authorities because federal "equitable sharing" provisions reward local police forces directly.
See Blumenson and Nilson, supra note 299, at 106-08.
For an interesting discussion of how Congress and the Court have, on repeated occasion,
conferred federal powers (and, importantly, resources) on willing local governments, even
when contrary to the desire of state legislatures, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State:
The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999). Hills notes that with such end-runs, "the city-a creature of the
state-[invokes] federal law to defeat the will of the state government, its creator." Id at 1202.
3
-o Localism I, supra note 4, at 112-13 (stating that "[l]ocal autonomy has taken on an air
of permanence. State legislatures and state and federal courts have proven unwilling to limit
local power or alter the structure of state-local relations, even after the effects of local autonomy
in promoting interlocal inequality and local parochialism have been demonstrated").
331 Compelling evidence of this proliferation is found in the evolution of New Haven,
Connecticut: during the nineteenth century, the city's municipal code grew by a mere 170
pages; during the twentieth century, the code grew by almost 1,100 pages, despite a
comparatively modest increase in population. See Robert C. Ellickson, Taming the Leviathan:
Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL
L. REV. 101, 105-06 (2000).
332See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
333 See Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
'34 Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 267,322 (1998).
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and to suggest that the prevailing uncritical embrace of local authority be
tempered with some reserve, not to argue against local authority in principle.
Indeed, there are apparent benefits to localism and the diversity it can bring; most
particularly, in theory at least, it affords a heightened legislative nimbleness and
responsiveness to particularized local needs.335 In addition, because the financial
costs associated with police and jails are, in the end, to be paid mainly by
municipal governments, it would appear sensible and just to provide them (and
not the distant, financially insulated state) ample prerogative to specify criminal
behaviors. Taken together, these virtues might encourage looking upon local
criminal laws as "trumps"; autonomous products of decentralized government as
to which Professor Clayton Gillette has recently urged deference.336 In so doing,
we might eventually embrace a deferential "checkerboard" approach to inter-
governmental relations similar to how tribal governments are viewed 37 or a
335 See Neuman, supra note 315, at 305 (stating that "local governments are designed to
pursue contrasting policies, each within its own sphere. These variations are not irrational, or
enforced for their own sakes, but are the necessary result of maximizing local-determination in
a democratic society").
336 See Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1347 (1997). Professor Gillette invokes the concept to describe instances where local
governments have been afforded an "explicit veto" or "exclusive jurisdiction over a subject that
the central government desires to regulate." Id. at 1347. Of course, such carve-outs in the
criminal law arena are rare. In practical reality, however, the weakness of preemption and
conflict analysis suggests a "trmp" effect at work in the state-local dynamic, making the
analogy a useful one.
33 See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 499-502 (1979) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to statute conferring "checkerboard" jurisdiction over Indian
territory). Like local governments, which are invested with authority by their coordinate states,
the tribes, for the most part, derive power and recognition from the federal government. See
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (stating that "Congress has plenary
authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes
otherwise possess"). Like municipalities, tribal governments also have their own courts, which
lack jurisdiction over "major" crimes. See Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction
over Matters Arising in Indian Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction among Tribal,
State and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973, 988 (2000). One key difference,
however, lies in the criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by the respective governments: tribes lack
jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians for misdemeanors committed on reservation lands, unlike
municipalities which are free to prosecute non-residents. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In so deciding, the Oliphant Court was at pains to emphasize its
concern that non-Indians not be subject to losses of liberty at the hands of "alien" justice
systems. Id at 210-11.
For more on the idea that municipalities might be regarded in a fashion similar to the way
tribes are regarded by the state and federal governments, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits
of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian
Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1998); Kevin J. Worthen, Two Sides of the
Same Coin: The Potential Normative Power of American Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND.
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super-autonomous imperium in imperio (sovereignty with a sovereignty) form of
governance contemplated early in the Republic, 338 characterized by intrastate, not
just interstate, variation in criminal laws-perhaps to the nation's ultimate good.
As discussed here, however, whether the benefits of localism, such as advanced in
support of municipal control over zoning, education, and other traditionally
"local" concerns, extend to the realm of the criminal law (with its distinct
personal and social consequences) remains a crucial question that will continue to
loom in the years to come.
L. REv. 1273 (1991).338 See generally Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of
Empire in New York 1750-1777, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 319 (1998). Such a model of
governance was a source of great controversy in the Framing Era, so much so that Samuel
Adams characterized it as a "Solecism in Politics." H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1526 (1987) (quoting Letter
from Samuel Adams to HA. Cushing (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 4 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL
ADAMS 324 (H. Cushing ed., 1908)).
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